Aghas, Sheiks, and Daesh in Iraq: Kurdish robust action in turmoil by Couch,  Christopher M.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2015-06
Aghas, Sheiks, and Daesh in Iraq: Kurdish robust
action in turmoil
Couch,  Christopher M.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
AGHAS, SHEIKS, AND DAESH IN IRAQ:  








Thesis Advisor:  Sean Everton 
Co-Advisor: Doowan Lee 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
June 2015 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
AGHAS, SHEIKS, AND DAESH IN IRAQ: KURDISH ROBUST ACTION IN 
TURMOIL 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
6. AUTHOR: Christopher M. Couch 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
N/A 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
 
The conflicts in Iraq and Syria are protracted civil wars with multi-state and non-state actors vying for influence. Iraqi 
Kurdistan is arguably the most important partner for the United States in our current fight against Daesh, which has 
exploited the factional politics of Iraq. Special Operations Forces (SOF) will be maintaining persistent engagement in 
the region for the foreseeable future, and must understand the formal and informal relational structures that underpin 
these conflicts. This project is a social network and social movement theory analysis of the power structures of Iraqi 
Kurdistan. It attempts to provide more awareness to Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) and U.S. 
policy makers on the patrons, influencers, and brokers that they can leverage in their efforts to understand and 
influence the Kurds. This thesis thoroughly examines the patronage nature of Iraqi Kurdistan since WWI and provides 
insight into individuals from minority groups and political parties that are structurally located in positions of 
brokerage and influence. With this information, SOCCENT, the project’s sponsor, will be better able to understand 
the region. Furthermore, the conflicts of the future will likely involve protracted, multi-factional, intrastate civil wars, 








14. SUBJECT TERMS Kurdistan, Iraq, Daesh, patronage, social network analysis, social movement 
theory 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
93

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 ii
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
AGHAS, SHEIKS, AND DAESH IN IRAQ:  
KURDISH ROBUST ACTION IN TURMOIL 
 
 
Christopher M. Couch 
Major, United States Army 
B.S., United States Military Academy, 2005 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 
























John Arquilla, Ph.D. 
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
 iv




The conflicts in Iraq and Syria are protracted civil wars with multi-state and non-state 
actors vying for influence. Iraqi Kurdistan is arguably the most important partner for the 
United States in our current fight against Daesh, which has exploited the factional politics 
of Iraq. Special Operations Forces (SOF) will be maintaining persistent engagement in 
the region for the foreseeable future, and must understand the formal and informal 
relational structures that underpin these conflicts. This project is a social network and 
social movement theory analysis of the power structures of Iraqi Kurdistan. It attempts to 
provide more awareness to Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) and U.S. 
policy makers on the patrons, influencers, and brokers that they can leverage in their 
efforts to understand and influence the Kurds. This thesis thoroughly examines the 
patronage nature of Iraqi Kurdistan since WWI and provides insight into individuals from 
minority groups and political parties that are structurally located in positions of brokerage 
and influence. With this information, SOCCENT, the project’s sponsor, will be better 
able to understand the region. Furthermore, the conflicts of the future will likely involve 
protracted, multi-factional, intrastate civil wars, where the lessons learned from the 
Kurdish situation will serve future SOF well. 
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According to the guiding documents of U.S. Special Operations Command 
(USSOCOM), entitled SOCOM 2020, and U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
(USASOC), entitled ARSOF 2022, it is essential to preventing future conflict, as well as 
achieving success in current conflicts, to build and maintain a Global Special Operations 
Forces (SOF) Network.1 Crucial to that goal is persistent engagement with and 
understanding of the human domain.2 Persistent engagement is particularly important in 
the arena of special warfare. Special warfare is defined as: 
The execution of activities that involve a combination of lethal and non-
lethal actions taken by specially trained and educated forces that have a 
deep understanding of cultures and foreign language, proficiency in small-
unit tactics, subversion, sabotage and the ability to build and fight 
alongside indigenous combat formations in a permissive, uncertain or 
hostile environment.3 
In order to conduct successful special warfare in the future, it will be important to 
build an in-depth understanding of the important social networks in any area of 
operations, and to understand the social movements in which those networks fall. The 
Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs) are responsible for managing the 
persistent engagement and building the understanding of the important social networks of 
their areas. Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) is looking for help 
analyzing influential social networks in Kurdistan, the stateless nation that encompasses 
the northern parts of Iraq, the eastern parts of Syria, the southern areas of Turkey, and the 
western areas of Iran. Currently, SOCCENT lacks an in-depth knowledge of the 
institutions and networks that exercise influence on the population and politics within 
Kurdistan.  
                                                 
1 United States Special Operations Command, SOCOM 2020, 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf.  
2 U.S. Army Special Operations Command, ARSOF 2022 (Headquarters, Department of the Army, 
2012), http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF2022_vFINAL.pdf.  
3 Ibid., 10. 
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A. PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
Given the rapid growth of Daesh4 and the disintegration of the Iraqi state,5 the 
Kurdish region is becoming increasingly important to U.S. national interests. The Kurds 
have been historically staunch allies to U.S. interests, and when the United States sent 
SOF to help combat Daesh, it set up a joint operations center not only with the Iraqi 
military, but also with the Peshmerga (militia) forces of the Kurdish region. The Kurdish 
region of Iraq has complex political and social networks, the understanding of which is 
essential for SOCCENT’s forces during current operations and while maintaining 
persistent presence in Kurdistan into the future.  
The main purpose of this thesis is to understand the networks surrounding the 
leaders of the major Kurdish political parties and connective tissues between and among 
them. The political parties of the most interest are the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan 
(PUK), the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and Gorran. However, there are also 
smaller minority groups and political parties traditionally overlooked by U.S. efforts, 
which appear to occupy essential structural positions within Iraqi Kurdsistan. This 
report’s social network analysis (SNA) attempts to identify the key players on which 
SOCCENT should focus its engagement efforts. SNA provides insight into how 
enmeshed these networks have become not only between each other, but also with other 
major groups in Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran.  
B. RESEARCH QUESTION AND ARGUMENT 
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions: What influential networks in 
Iraqi Kurdistan can be utilized for special warfare purposes? In particular, who are the 
emerging leaders of the political parties? Who are the brokers and boundary spanners? 
How connected or separate are the different parties with each other? And, finally, how 
connected are the parties to outside entities, especially independence movements in 
                                                 
4 Douglas OlliVant and Robert H. Scales, “Terrorist Armies Fight Smarter and Deadlier than Ever,” 
Washington Post, August 1, 2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/terrorist-armies-are-fighting-
smarter-and-deadlier-than-ever/2014/08/01/3998ae00–18db-11e4–9e3b-7f2f110c6265_story.html.  
5 Tim Lister, “Iraq to Split in Three: So Why Not?” CNN, July 8, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/07/world/meast/iraq-division-lister/.  
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Turkey and Iran, and the Iranian government? We know that the Iranian Government is 
working with the Peshmerga, but how connected are they to Kurdish political networks?6  
The combination of social network analysis and social movement theory provides 
insight to SOCCENT into which actors can best create long-term relationships (persistent 
engagement) in order to harness the power of the Kurdish nationalist movement (social 
movement) and benefit SOCCENT’s regional mission. The linkage is clear between 
social network analysis and social movement theory,7 as well as how social movement 
theory applies to the conduct of special warfare.8 It will be imperative that as SOCCENT 
operates in this critical area of Iraq during its current engagement with Daesh, and, as it 
maintains its engagement long into the future, SOCCENT must use the insight from both 
methods to shape their efforts.  
C. METHODOLOGY AND THESIS ORGANIZATION 
After an overview of the sociology of influence, social movement theory (SMT) 
and social network analysis (SNA) (in Chapter II), the first step in this research process 
was to understand what influence and power look like in Kurdistan, and build a 
fundamental understanding of the culture and traditions of the Kurds (reviewed in 
Chapter III). Then, in order to conduct SNA, as much data as possible was collected on 
the ties between actors in the region and each of the interconnected, and many times 
redundant, power structures. Using the tools SNA, the relational data was analyzed in 
order to gain an understanding of the social networks involved in Iraqi Kurdistan 
(outlined in Chapter IV). Finally, drawing on SMT and research into the history of the 
region, Chapter V places the results of the SNA into context in order to provide potential 
avenues of approach for SOCCENT’s persistent engagement efforts in the human 
domain.  
                                                 
6 Shelly Kittleson, “US, Iran Woo Rival Kurdish Factions in Battle against IS,” Al-Monitor, September 
22, 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/peshmerga-iraq-iran-kurd-isis-krg.html.  
7 Mario Diani and Doug McAdam, Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to 
Collective Action (London: Oxford University Press, 2003).  
8 Doowan Lee. “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” Special Warfare, 
Volume 26, issue 3, September 2013, http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2603/SW26_03.pdf. 
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SOCCENT must operationally determine if the individuals this project identifies 
have the agency to take advantage of their structural positions. This thesis provides 
information for SOCCENT on what role the individuals identified potentially plays, and 
how they will be useful for harnessing the power of the social movement. Hopefully, 
future students will continue to contribute knowledge of the power networks in 
Kurdistan; as such, this is not a definitive or final project, but the start of an ongoing one. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To answer the research question, this thesis draws on insights from three bodies of 
knowledge: the sociology of authority and influence, social network analysis (SNA), and 
social movement theory (SMT). The following research provided the starting point for 
identifying the key personnel within Iraqi Kurdistan for SOCCENT to focus their 
engagement. The codebook used in the SNA mapping takes into account the lessons 
learned from this literature and ensures that individuals this project identifies are not only 
located in potentially advantageous positions within the social structure, but that they 
have the right attributes and agency to contribute to the situation in Kurdistan. 
A. INFLUENCE 
Max Weber, in his Theory of Social and Economic Organization, identifies three 
sources of authority and influence: Rational authority, which is derived from rules and 
laws; traditional authority, which is derived from the traditions a society lives by; and 
finally charismatic authority gained from the extraordinary character of an individual. 
Weber demonstrates the strengths of all three types but cautions against the instability of 
charismatic authority.9 For social movements, it is important to make sure leaders of all 
three types are represented because they serve different purposes. In the case of 
Kurdistan, there is a complex interaction of all three forms, with the traditional and 
charismatic authority tending to be dominant. 
Weber’s analysis raises some interesting points for approaching Kurdistan from a 
social movement and network analysis approach. Though all types of leadership exert 
influence, charismatic leaders have the greatest potential to do so because they are able to 
mobilize support through the legend of their personality. The only exception would be the 
potential for former royalty to carry endowed influence beyond their own charisma.10 In 
Kurdistan, both Jalal Talibani and Masud Barzani possessed such clout, which was 
                                                 
9 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
2009).  
10 Ibid.  
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endowed to them by their families tribal and religious leadership positions; however, they 
also became charismatic leaders of their movements. Although charisma is the most 
desired trait for a movement’s leader, it must eventually be rationalized or traditionalized; 
because it is unstable, the transfer of power, whether from assassination or otherwise, can 
undo all the leader has accomplished.11 When thinking in a social movement perspective, 
a structure must be erected around even a charismatic leader for the movement to 
succeed. This structure will also likely contain the future leaders of the movement, and 
we can identify those with this leadership potential through SNA of the leaders’ ties. 
Kurdistan is at a turning point in its history because the state leadership is rationalizing. 
Recently, there has been a slow shift to more inclusionary politics brought on by the 
Kurdish Spring, the coming end of Barzani’s presidency, and the aging of Talibani.12 
In When Do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on Leadership Dynamics in Social 
Movements, Sharon Erickson Nepstad and Clifford Bob bring leadership specifically into 
the social movement realm, and highlight the important roles leaders play.13 Leaders are 
essential in mobilizing the disaffected population, activating third-party actors internal 
and external to the situation, and determining how the group deals with the inevitable 
state repression. Nepstad and Bob argue that not only do leaders make movements, 
movements make leaders. They distill the ideas of Weber and others, in particular Pierre 
Bourdieu,14 into an easy-to-grasp idea of leadership capital. In essence, they argue that 
every type of leader (and Weber argues all leaders are really a combination of the three 
types) is able to lead by possessing a large amount of leadership capital. Comprised of 
cultural, social, and symbolic capital, leadership capital allows a leader to play an 
essential role in a movement. Cultural capital is the comprehensive understanding of the 
issues, grievances, and experiences of the local people and how they fit into the society, 
                                                 
11 Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.  




13 Clifford Bob and Sharon Erickson Nepstad “When do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on Leadership 
Dynamics in Social Movements,” 1–22.  
14 Pierre Bourdieu, Language and Symbolic Power (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991). 
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which allows leaders to tailor policies to the people’s needs.15 This is an important part of 
the narrative framing of the Kurdish nationalist movement. Social capital is the amount of 
strong and weak ties people have from a SNA perspective. The former make it easier for 
a group to mobilize and minimize free riding, while the latter help leaders disseminate 
information, recruit followers, and appeal for support to far larger audience than direct 
social ties (i.e., strong ties) can reach. 16 Finally, symbolic capital is the prestige and 
honor of holding a position of social recognition17—something the current leaders of 
Kurdistan certainly enjoy. These types of capital explain why civil rights leaders in the 
U.S. United States were largely ministers—a position that gave them understanding of 
the people, many social ties, and the symbolism of being clergy. It also explains why 
many of the powerful Kurds are from families of Sheiks ad tribal leaders. These forms of 
leadership capital are more useful than Weber’s influence factors for studying Kurdistan.  
Important for identifying future leaders of a social movement in general, and 
Kurdistan in particular, is determining how well a movement will respond to the loss of 
its leader, and how to help structure the movement so it is resilient to such assassination. 
Unfortunately, assassination is fairly common among resistance leaders; so, what factors 
lead to some having continued success and others not? In Kill a Leader, Murder a 
Movement Nepstad and Bob suggest 12 hypotheses that seek to provide tentative answers 
to that problem and, in turn, offer insight into how to assassination-proof a movement. 
The following are the broad categories the hypotheses fall under. First, the type of leader 
matters, and prophetic leaders (charismatic) tend to create outrage and a chance for 
growth as long as succession issues are planned for and resolved quickly. Second is how 
strong the ideology of martyrdom of the group and society is—if it is high, the group is 
likely to grow after the death of a leader; if not, then it is far less likely to. Third is how 
much of the movement is embodied by the leader—if the leader’s embodiment is high, 
                                                 
15 Bob and Nepstad, “When do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on Leadership Dynamics in Social 
Movements,” 1–22.  
16 Ibid., 1–22.  
17 Ibid., 1–22.  
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third party groups’ interest will raise with his or her death.18 An example of this occurred 
in the wake of Mullah Mustafa Barzani’s death (though it was not an assassination). After 
Barzani’s death, the KDP fractured, and the PUK was able to take the mantle of the 
Kurds in Iraq. The fourth category is how united the group is without the leader. Is the 
leader holding two different groups together through charisma alone? In Kurdistan, the 
PUK and KDP have become largely tied to the Talibani and Barzani families. However, 
the ability of these leaders to dominate the Kurdish movement has dissipated in recent 
years. Talibani’s PUK divided when Fouad Massoum created the Gorran, and there is a 
growing movement within Kurdistan to move away from control by traditional elites.  
According to Aminzade, Goldstone, and Perry, it is important to associate with 
self-effacing leaders such as Mandela and Gandi as opposed to self-aggrandizing leaders 
like Stalin, Mao, and Robespierre. They argue that the former create more lasting effects 
than the latter. 19 It is essential to identify these leaders within the context of Kurdistan 
and Kurdish culture. The leadership of Mustafa, Masud Barzani, and Jalal Talibani 
demonstrates some of the dangers of self-aggrandizing leaders in that they failed to fully 
mobilize all of Kurdish society. There is a slow shift away from these types of leaders, 
and potentially self-effacing leaders are beginning to emerge. 
Kurdistan possesses a complex mix of tribal, familial, economic, religious, and 
political power structures that create a complex patronage system. These structures, their 
interaction, and the effect they have on power and influence in Kurdistan are all explored 
in The Kurds: A Nation Denied, The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics, and The Agha, 
Shaikh and State.20 Understanding these complex dynamics is essential to contextualize 
relational data and social network analysis. Specifically, in Kurdistan, it will be difficult 
to identify honest brokers. Historically, even when opportunities arose for Kurdish 
                                                 
18 Bob and Nepstad, “When do Leaders Matter? Hypotheses on Leadership Dynamics in Social 
Movements,” 1–22.  
19 Ron Aminzade, Jack A. Goldstone and Elizabeth J. Perry, “Leadership Dynamics and Dynamics of 
Contention,” Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics (2001): 126–154.  
20 David McDowall, The Kurds: A Nation Denied (London, UK: Harry Ransom Humanities Research 
Center, 1992) ; Fāliḥ ʻAbd al-Jabbār and Hosham Dawod, The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics (London, 
UK: Saqi Books, 2006); Martin Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political 
Structures of Kurdistan (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1992).  
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independence, the leaders of the different groups in the country fought each other for 
power instead of fighting together for independence. Because of this, and the complex 
interaction between the tribes, families and political parties, identifying potential brokers 
and future leaders can help SOCCENT identify who to leverage in order to affect the 
internal politics of Kurdistan.  
B. SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY AND SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS 
After analyzing influence and power and how they relate to SNA and SMT, the 
strengths and weaknesses of charismatic leaders is clear. This is also a traditional 
problem for the Kurds. In his article “George Washington and the Whig Conception of 
Heroic Leadership,” Barry Schwartz presents a different type of charismatic leader who 
is better suited for leadership positions. The key is to find the right type of person who 
has the right intentions (agency) and is located in the proper cultural and social structural 
positions within society. In essence, the type of leader that is better suited for long-term 
stability is someone who is intelligent but not power seeking. He or she must be a 
believer in the cause, but not solely in himself or herself. Most importantly, the leader 
must fit the proper needs of the society and movement at the time. Congress knew, in the 
beginning, that George Washington was acceptable to all groups looking to challenge 
Britain, but it was the military fervor that transformed him into the symbol of the 
revolution. When the revolution shifted to peace, Washington was known more for his 
fight to relinquish power than trying to keep it. This endeared him to a nation that was 
inherently skeptical of power. 21 Though the specifics in Kurdistan differ, SOCCENT 
will need to identify who meets the Kurdish ideals of heroism, who is more interested in 
the success of the movement than personal accolades, and who occupies key structural 
positions within the complex power structures of the region. 
When using SNA and SMT to analyze the power networks of Iraqi Kurdistan, it is 
essential to understand the role brokers play in movements, and the importance of agency 
                                                 
21 Barry Schwartz, “George Washington and the Whig Conception of Heroic Leadership,” American 
Sociological Review (1983): 18–33.  
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in identifying the proper brokers. The following literature thematically deals with what 
agency is, what brokers are, and the roles that they play.  
 The article “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency” provides 
the theoretical framework used to identify the right kind of brokers. In it, Mustafa 
Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin argue that in order for SNA to be effective, it must 
incorporate the insights of social theorists and historical sociologists. After detailing three 
broad theoretical perspectives within SNA—structural instrumentalism, structural 
determinism and structural constructionism—they argue that the latter is the only one to 
use. In order for change to happen, it is not the place in the network alone that matters, 
but the will, or agency, of the actors as well. Networks do largely impact the behavior of 
actors, but the opposite is also true: actors can dramatically change the networks in which 
they are embedded through their actions.22 Thus, with regard to the Kurdish power 
networks, it is insufficient to simply identify those who occupy key leadership or 
brokerage positions; we also have to gain an understanding of the practices and cultural 
norms that govern the ties and agents within the context of the greater movement. 
In his analysis of Paul Revere’s and Joseph Warren’s roles as brokers within the 
American Revolution, Shin-Kap Han identifies key aspects of brokerage that are 
applicable to the SOCCENT project. First, he accepts that brokers occupy a specific 
location within social networks. They are on the periphery of multiple groups, cross 
structural gaps within the network, and they likely do not occupy formal positions within 
any group. However, location is not enough to be a good broker. What made Revere and 
Warren so effective was their ability to occupy positions in the major revolutionary 
groups from both the politically elite class and the lower class. Revere, being a 
silversmith with a genius for being in the middle of important events, and Warren, being 
a doctor who treated members of all classes, were able to link the two groups together. In 
order to be an exceptional broker they had to be respected and trusted in multiple 
important groups, not use that key location to profit off the power the position affords, 
and be willing to introduce people from the different groups to close the structural gaps 
                                                 
22 Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin, “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of Agency,” 
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that makes them brokers. Good brokers try to work themselves out of their job. In this 
way, Revere and Warren connected the intellectual center of the revolution with the 
militiamen and masses necessary for a successful revolution.23 With regard to the Kurds, 
someone who fills this role would need strong relations between two tribes, be a member 
of one of the political parties that is not usually linked to their tribe, and through their 
work be tied to the workers of Kurdistan who are not tribally oriented. The very best 
would also, currently or historically, participate in the Peshmerga (militia). However, 
they must also have the personality and agency to connect these groups and not exploit 
their unique position for gain.  
Works by Kevan Harris and Killian Clarke analyze the role that brokers played 
recently in the Iranian green movement of 2009 and the ousting of Hosni-Mubarak in 
Egypt in 2011. Brokerage was different in these two very different movements, but both 
offer insight into how social movement’s work, as well as insight into the future of 
Kurdistan, which had its own Kurdish Spring in 2011.  
Kevan Harris discusses how three things turned a previously apathetic populace 
into spontaneous revolutionaries in 2011 Iran. The first was the perceived safe place for 
brokered exuberance offered by the political campaign and the spontaneous party like 
atmosphere the televised debates created in the public squares. In this atmosphere, 
people’s perceived risk dropped to the point where they would take risks and protest. 
When the election’s outcome did not match the movement’s expectations, they continued 
to gather. The second was the role that these political gatherings played in creating face-
to-face contact between previously un-networked people. This face-to-face brokerage 
between individuals from previously separate groups created grass roots gatherings, 
which were hard for the state to predict or control. The Internet was not as useful as the 
international media portrayed it to be. It was really only useful for messaging and not for 
face-to-face interaction for organizing the movement. Finally, it was the increased size of 
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the middle class that exercised newfound power in this movement.24 In Kurdistan, these 
similar forces may be accessed by analyzing the political groups in the last Kurdish 
elections, and identify those who participated.  
Killian Clarke discusses how it was the Egyptian youth on the periphery of the 
political opposition, the Egyptian Labor Movement, and the Muslim Brotherhood who 
turned themselves into brokers when the opportunity to oust Mubarak presented itself. 
The youth on the periphery were active in NGO’s and worker’s issues and connected the 
political opposition with the labor movement. The youth reformers within the Muslim 
Brotherhood, who had long hoped to moderate their organization and work alongside 
opposition, recognized the sudden change in the opportunity structures and convinced the 
Brotherhoods leadership to join the uprising. These individuals occupied key brokerage 
roles only for the fourteen days of the movement yet were key to its success.25 This 
ability to take advantage of the shift in opportunity structures is where the Kurds have 
been historically weak. If those who occupy ideal positions in social networks and have 
the proper agency can be lead to act as the brokers like in Egypt, they could potentially 
bring the traditionally feuding groups together in Kurdistan. At the same time the Arab 
Spring was sweeping Egypt, there was a similar phenomenon, the Kurdish Spring, 
happening in Kurdistan. Members of the reformist Gorran party, Kurdish Islamist parties, 
students, intellectuals, and labor organizations protested the patronage nature of 
Kurdistan’s politics.  
For historic data on the Kurdish nationalist movement of Kurdistan, David 
Romano analyzes the Kurdish nationalist Movement from a social movement 
perspective, identifying historically where it has been strong and weak. His analysis looks 
at how the movement has dealt with structural opportunities, resource mobilization, and 
identity framing. Though he focuses on the movement in Turkey, he uses Iraq as a case 
study because it is the subset of the movement that has managed to come the closest to 
autonomy. Generally speaking, he argues that the Kurds have been unable to take 
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advantage of structural opportunities such as the Iran-Iraq war because of infighting 
along tribal, religious, and economic lines. Because of divisions between leadership, the 
Kurds have been unable to mobilize resources within Kurdistan or gain support from 
outside. The Kurds of northern Iraq have been the best at this of all the Kurdish diaspora. 
The Iraqi Kurds in general have done a great job of identity framing and creating a sense 
of being “Kurdish” but have fallen short in creating a unified identity, specifically in 
bringing the tribally aligned Kurds (with a focus on traditional elites) together with the 
working class and peasant Kurds. However, Iraqi Kurds have done the best of all Kurdish 
groups with grievance framing, and this is a main reason why they have gained 
international support for the Kurdish Autonomous Zone in Iraq after 1991.26 
The book, Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, 
Iran, Iraq and Syria, analyzes the current situation of the Kurds in the region and the role 
they potentially play in the democratization of the Middle East. Its authors analyze past 
issues of the social movement for context, but focus on how far the Kurds have come, 
especially in Iraq, and where they are going. They discuss the democratic example the 
Kurds of Iraq present and the success of their federal region of Iraq. They note how the 
rest of Iraq, primarily the Sunni areas, can apply similar ideals and Iraq will be more 
successful. The Kurdish Spring is also discussed and how it is moving away from 
traditional elite power structures to a democracy more inclusive of minority ideas and 
groups.27 This became especially important when the SNA identified minority 
individuals with key structural location in the power networks of Kurdistan.  
Dr. Sean Everton’s Disrupting Dark Networks identifies which metrics are 
associated with power and influence in social network analysis. “SNA is a collection of 
theories and methods that assumes that actors’ behavior is profoundly affected by their 
ties to others and the networks in which they are embedded.”28 Rather than viewing 
actors as unaffected by those around them, SNA assumes that interaction patterns affect 
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what actors do, say, and believe. “SNA differs from more traditional approaches in that 
that others tend to focus on actors’ attributes (e.g., gender, race, education)”29 in that it 
examine on how interaction patterns affect behavior. It notes that while attributes 
typically do not vary across social contexts, most interaction patterns do, “suggesting that 
interaction patterns are just as (or perhaps more) important for predicting and 
understanding behavior than are attributes.”30 Consequently, a primary goal of SNA has 
been to develop metrics that help analysts gain a better understanding of a particular 
network’s structural features.31 
The basic measurements of power, influence and prestige are the centrality 
measures of a network. In short the more connections an actor has, the more central and, 
likely, the more powerful that actor is in a network. There are also those who are 
structurally located between two or more groups, and have the ability to connect those 
two groups. These are called brokers and are essential for the spread of information, 
innovation, ideas or goods across the network. Generally they have high betweeness 
centrality and are located on the periphery of two distinct groups.32 As such, SNA has the 
potential to reveal a great deal about the structure of Kurdish networks, which will help 
indicate the resiliency and usefulness of different groups for future engagement.  
Doowan Lee, in his “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare,” 
discusses social movement theory (SMT) as a comprehensive analysis framework 
consisting of the common ingredients to collective action against the power structures of 
society. It consists of an analysis of how a movement deals with the structural or political 
opportunities that the state or international community presents, what the organizational 
capacity of the movement is to mobilize its human and material resources, and how well 
the movement frames its narrative to create strategic framing. The civil rights movement 
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in the U.S. and the Arab spring throughout the Middle East are both examples of social 
movements.33 
Not only does Lee give a good background of SMT, but he also provides the 
necessary connection of SMT to successful special warfare.34 This connection is key to 
Iraqi Kurdistan because the U.S. has conducted special warfare in Kurdistan sporadically 
throughout the last two decades, and continues to do so today. It is essential for 
SOCCENT and the U.S. to understand how the Kurds have succeeded and failed as a 
social movement so as to best tailor policy and strategy to the region.  
C. ROBUST ACTION 
John Padgett and Christopher Ansell’s “Robust Action and The Rise of the 
Medici,” is an excellent analysis of how Cosimo De Medici built a robust political 
network that out-performed his rivals, the Oligarchs.35 The lessons learned from the 
study apply to the building of any robust network today and are especially applicable to 
the Kurdish region of Iraq. Cosimo centralized political power in Renaissance Florence 
by understanding the networks that surrounded him and changing his persona to best take 
advantage of each network. Through the use of marriage, patronage, and business ties, 
Cosimo placed himself as the only bridge between the new rich, many of the old families, 
and the different geographic areas of the city. He intentionally ensured that the different 
groups only interacted through him. In this way, he was able to ride the macro-economic 
forces that he did not (and could not) control.  
Padgett and Ansell call the activities that Medici conducted, robust action, which 
consists of the ability to be multi-vocal. That is, the ability to have one action viewed 
coherently and favorably, yet differently from multiple perspectives, and have single 
actions be moves in multiple games at once.36 In this way, it is possible to be the judge 
and boss mentioned above and not parse public and private motives.  
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Padget and Ansel discuss how Cosimo De Medici became not only a boundary 
spanner but extremely central to Florence. Because he never “sought” political office and 
only reacted when others requested his involvement, he was able to be the boss and the 
judge, a dichotomy that is traditionally difficult in governance.37 Moreover, it always 
appeared that he was not acting in self-interest but in the interest of the city. In many 
ways his Oligarch rivals were very similar, except that their networks were closed, while 
De Medici acted as the broker between multiple networks. When the time came to 
mobilize resources, the Oligarchs were unable to mobilize their networks, while de-
Medici was able to quickly rally his.38  
With regard to Kurdistan, the methods employed by Cosimo De Medici can be 
very instructive. Kurdistan, like Renaissance Florence, has multiple overlapping power 
networks. There are the political parties, powerful families, tribes, regional alignments, 
religious groups, linguistic groups, and different economic groups. There are many 
similarities between Cosimo and Mullah Mustafa Barzani, the legendary leader of the 
Kurdish movement from the 1930s through 1975. He, like De Medici, was able to build 
alliances with multiple different groups, shift his persona, and continue to gain leverage 
from exile. Though not as successful, his ability to execute robust action left little room 
for rival factions during his prime. However, after his death, no single leader has shown 
the capability conduct robust action as he had. Does Fouad Massoum of Gorran have the 
connections and ability, or is there another future leader of the Kurds that is still 
relatively unknown?  
Maryjane Osa’s, “Troublemakers and Counter-Revolutionaries: Network 
Development and Protest Cycles in Authoritarian Regimes,”39 studies nine separate 
opposition networks to the Leninist polish government during the cold war. She stresses 
the importance of the Catholic Church, its associations, and how it served as the sole 
structural element and maintained continuity in the movement. She analyzes how protest 
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cycles work under eastern authoritarian regimes and seeks to dispel the idea that social 
movement theories are biased towards Western democracies and do not apply outside of 
that framework.  
She argues that with an authoritarian environment the same principles apply, yet 
have to be implemented differently. Even though there is suppression of political activity, 
media and individual due process rights, there are still political opportunities with elite 
allies and short-term changes in the environment. Movements must find other ways to 
spread their message outside the media. In the case of Poland, the Catholic Church 
provided the political space, venues, and means to spread the narrative. It built the 
networks needed to take advantage of temporary changes in the opportunity structures.40 
In a similar fashion, the religious networks of the Naqshibandi and Qadiri Sufi orders 
were instrumental in mobilizing the Kurds against Baghdad, throughout the twentieth 
century. 
Roger Gould, in “Power and Social Structure in Community Elites,” conducts an 
empirical study of power in social structure. He develops a quantitative measure (inter-
clique betweenness) of an individual’s structural capacity for brokerage. As it increases, 
the broker potential and perceived influence of the individual also increases. He argues 
that position in elite social networks is a better indicator of power than the ability to 
mobilize resources because brokers can orient groups toward a single goal, while those 
who possess the ability to mobilize resources often undermine each other. Those with 
resources tend to not have impartiality, while being a broker requires it.41 This is related 
to the power of Cosimo De Medici. He could execute robust action because he lay 
embedded within and was the broker between multiple cliques or groups. Chapter IV 
identifies a number of individuals with high inter-clique betweeness who occupy these 
key structural positions.  
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Finally, in “Patronage Politics and Contentious Collective Action: A Recursive 
Relationship” Javier Auyero, Pablo Lapegna and Fernanda Page Poma discuss the 
recursive relationship between patronage politics and contentious collective action in 
contemporary Argentina. They argue that these are not opposite political phenomena. 
Rather, they interact when the network breaks down, they receive clandestine support, or 
they react to threats. This is counter to the common belief that patronage networks 
undermine collective action. Auyero, Lapegna and Poma argue that in specific 
circumstances, the two actually are mutually beneficial: In particular, when the break 
down of patronage networks leads to collective action, when patrons validate or certify a 
movement for benefit, when the patronage network provides clandestine support to the 
movement, and when the patronage network is responding to an attack. 42 All of these 
situations were present in Argentina, but they also help explain how the power structures 
of Kurdistan have historically reacted. There is clear patronage politics in Kurdistan, 
which has many times worked in conjunction with the Kurdish Nationalist Movement, 
specifically in response to threats. However, in Kurdistan, it has also hindered the 
movement because of the inability of the patronage groups to work together or gain 
support from the whole society.  
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III. THEIR OWN WORST ENEMY: A SOCIAL MOVEMENT 
ANALYSIS OF THE IRAQI KURDS 
“If only there were harmony among us, 
if we were to obey a single one of us, 
he would reduce to vassalage 
Turks, Arabs and Persians, all of them 
we would perfect our religion, our state, 
and would educate ourselves in learning and wisdom.” 
—Kurdish Poet Ahmad-I Khani, 169243 
 
The Kurds are the largest supranational nation in the world. They occupy 
contiguous territory spanning from northeast Syria, southern Turkey, northern Iraq, and 
western Iran. The Kurdish ethnicity, with a distinct cultural and linguistic identity, has 
existed for over two millennia, yet they have no state.44 Most importantly for this 
particular project is what has shaped the fault lines between the major Kurdish political 
groups and how the answer to this question matters to the study of collective actions 
outside of Iraq. The short answer is that the traditional power struggles between rival 
tribal, geographic, religious, and linguistic groups continually hinder the collective action 
of the Kurds of Iraq, especially when the opportunity for autonomy presents itself. This is 
especially important because similar dynamics play out in many nationalist movements, 
yet academics and policy makers largely ignore them.45 One critique of social movement 
theory is that it has a Western, liberal bias. This study of the Kurds falls outside such a 
norm.46 It is important for SOCCENT and its endeavor to better understand the human 
domain of northern Iraq, and it may also provide insight for SOF that will likely have to 
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wade through similarly murky waters when aiding collective action in future conflicts 
elsewhere.  
Although the Kurds have existed for millennia, the idea of a Kurdish nation is 
relatively recent, beginning its coalescence around the turn of the 20th Century.47 The 
analysis that follows will examine the Kurdish nationalist movement in Iraq at five 
distinct epochs, in particular, when the political structures over the Kurds offered the 
most space for collective action. The following periods are analyzed: The period between 
the end of WWI and the end of WWII, the rise of the Ba’ath Party in Iraq through the 
Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War of 1991, post the 2003 invasion of Iraq and removal of 
Saddam Hussein from power, and the current situation for Iraqi Kurds. For each of these 
periods, this chapter analyzes the opportunity structures, the resource mobilization, and 
the identity framing of the nationalist movement. Finally, it explains why the Kurds are in 
the best situation they have ever been in for collective action and why that matters to 
SOCCENT and U.S. policy makers.  
A. BACKGROUND 
A social movement is the collective action of a group of people united with a 
common purpose, engaged in sustained interaction with the established power structures, 
and intent on improving their standing within their state. In this particular case, whether 
the end goal is independence or regional autonomy is currently a matter of debate in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.48 Social movement theory (SMT) examines how the movement deals with the 
structural opportunities presented by the state and the international community, its ability 
to mobilize both human and material resources, and how well it creates a shared 
collective consciousness.49 SMT interacts with the SNA in Chapter IV by providing the 
overarching framework and background for the Kurdish power structures analyzed there. 
Without understanding the social movement the social network is a part of, the true value 
of the SNA lacks context. Conversely, without the SNA provided in Chapter IV, the 
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understanding of the social movement alone is very difficult to operationalize for those 
looking to affect change in the region. It is the combination of both analyses that provide 
the best way for SOCCENT to look at the power structures of Iraqi Kurdistan.  
Iraqi Kurdistan is a region that, while the vast majority of the population identifies 
as being Kurdish, is historically divided along tribal, religious, linguistic and regional 
lines. These interactions and divisions help explain much of the nationalist movement’s 
successes and failures. Generally speaking, the Kurds from the more mountainous 
northwestern areas of Iraqi Kurdistan, with Erbil as their cultural center, are more 
tribally-oriented and traditional. They are Naqshibandi Sufi’s and speak Kurmanji 
Kurdish. The Kurdish Democratic Party represents this group with the Barzanis being the 
largest patrons and their tribal power base being the tribes surrounding the village of 
Barzan.50 The Kurds of the plains and desert of southeastern Iraqi Kurdistan, with 
Sulaymaniyah as their cultural center, are more urbanized, less traditional, and less 
tribally-oriented. They are Qadiri Sufi’s, and speak Sorani Kurdish.51 The Patriotic Union 
of Kurdistan (PUK) represents this group with the Talibanis being the largest patrons. 
Though generally less tribally affiliated, the Talibanis garner much of their support from 
the large Zangana tribe. Both the Talibanis and Barzanis are not only tribal leaders but 
are also members of prominent sheikly families within the Qadiri and Naqshibandi orders 
respectively.52 These traditional elites continually engage in patronage politics and 
compete for power and resources, often at the expense of the social movement.  
When the Ottomans disbanded their emirates system in the late 19th century, it 
removed much of the tribal power structure. Before its end, the Ottomans would choose 
one tribal Agha to rule an area and all of the tribes within it as the Emir. When this 
system ended, the power base of tribal Aghas retreated back into their localized area. The 
tribes lacked administrative structure to mediate disputes and reverted to intertribal 
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conflict.53 The Sufi Sheiks filled this power vacuum. They soon became religious leaders, 
dispute mediators between tribes, and wealthy landowners. They married into the Aghas 
families and eventually became more powerful than the Aghas themselves. A few Sheiks 
became both Sheiks and Aghas, a status that carried a great deal of authority. Muhammed 
Barzani, the grandfather of the current president of Kurdistan Masud Barzani, was one of 
these men. It is these families, both tribally and religiously powerful, that still rule Iraqi 
Kurdistan and this is why the Barzanis and Talibanis remain so significant.54 There are 
many similarities between these powerful families and the Medici family discussed 
above, and an analysis of the intermarriages of these families is one area or future study 
this thesis recommends.  
The traditional tribal structures, as well as Sufi religious networks, have at times 
served the nationalist movement well. They provide charismatic leaders with clout 
endowed by traditional roles, as well as mobilizing structures and networks for the 
movement to co-opt.55 However, the rivalries between different factions have often come 
to the forefront whenever the opportunity for true independence arisen. The chance to 
increase power over traditional rivals has at times become more important than the cause 
of independence for many Kurdish elites. The best example of this is the rivalry between 
the Barzanis and Talibanis, which has at times thrown Iraqi Kurdistan into civil war. That 
situation may be changing, as Iraqi Kurdistan enters a new era of greater political 
inclusion and internal as well as international pressures.56  
B. WWI THROUGH WWII 
With the end of WWI, the Kurds gained their first real opportunity for 
independence. With the League of Nations and British espousal of self-determination, the 
Turks fighting the Armenians and Greeks and therefore unable to suppress a Kurdish 
uprising, the structures of the state and the international community appeared to offer the 
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opportunity necessary for the Kurds.57 The first leader of the nationalist movement, Sheik 
Mahmud Barzinji, misread this perceived openness of the political space, failed to 
overcome internal divisions and fully mobilize resources, and was unable to frame the 
struggle in a way that could overcome traditional rivalries.  
The Kurds were encouraged by the rhetoric coming from the League of Nations 
and the British. However, the British proved disingenuous and were unwilling to risk 
their significant oil interests in northern Iraq. Instead, after occupying Iraq in 1918, they 
installed the Hashemite king, Faisel, as ruler and determined that Iraq needed to be a 
contiguous state comprised of the three former Ottoman provinces of Mosul, Baghdad, 
and Basra. This combination created the modern state of Iraq, the Mosul portion of which 
contained the oil rich areas of Iraqi Kurdistan. Sheik Mahmud Barzinji, then the governor 
of Sulaymaniyah, desired more control and independence than the British and King 
Faisel were willing to give. When Barzinji revolted, the British violently suppressed the 
Kurds with aerial bombardments of civilian areas before occupying Kurdistan. With the 
British betraying their promises of Kurdish autonomy and the League of Nations 
unwilling to enforce self-determination, the political space for the Nationalist Movement 
quickly disappeared.58 
The power structures opened up again when the British mandate ended in 1930 
and the Iraqi government gained independence in 1932. Barzinji led one final revolt. This 
time, it was not the ability of their adversaries, it was Barzinji’s inability to overcome 
traditional divisions and mobilize the Kurds against the monarchy that ended the revolt. 
Barzinji, both an Agha of the Barzinji tribe and a Sheik of the Qadiri order, had grown 
powerful in his new role as a revolutionary. This led his traditional tribal rivals to throw 
their support against him. One example is the large and powerful Baban tribe who were 
hostile to Barzinji’s ambitions and supported Baghdad and the British against him.59 In 
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each one of Barzinji’s revolts, he could not unify the Kurds, and rival tribes allied with 
the Iraqi state.60 
Following Barzinji’s failures, there arose the first charismatic leader of the Iraqi 
Kurds, and the first to begin to build the idea of Kurdishness in earnest: Mullah Mustafa 
Barzani, who was an Agha and the son and brother of prominent Sheiks of the 
Naqshibandi order.61 That the first leaders of the nationalist movement were both tribally 
and religiously powerful demonstrated that Kurdistan still required leaders with the 
endowed authority of their traditions.62 In addition, the religious networks established by 
the Sufi Orders, especially the Naqshibandi’s, were essential in providing the structure 
and framework for the movement.63  
When the British and Hashemites attempted to “Arabize” the administration of 
Kurdistan, and consolidate their power, the tribal leaders led by Barzani made common 
cause with urban intellectuals, who would become the Politburo of the Kurdish 
Democratic Party (KDP) led by Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talibani.64 Barzani, because of 
his ability to mobilize his large tribal and religious base with over 6000 militiamen, 
convinced the nationalists to allow him to wed his cause to theirs, which allowed him to 
mobilize much larger and more heterogeneous groups than previous revolts.65 Even 
though often leftist, urban, anti-tribal, and critical of traditional elites, the nationalists 
recognized that the greatest chance for Kurdish success lay with Barzani. The way in 
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which Barzani rose to power has many parallels to Cosimo De-Medici’s rise in 
Renaissance Florence and is robust action in much the same way.66  
Though this coalition was necessary to boost political resources at the time, it 
hindered the nationalist movement’s ability to be more inclusive in the future. The 
inclusion of Barzani and his tribal forces pushed the leftist-leaning elements of the 
nationalist movements out. Barzani’s rising power and his status as an Agha and wealthy 
landowner also threatened rival tribes and prevented them joining the movement. The 
non-tribal peasant class had little faith that their situation would improve under the 
traditional structures Barzani represented and thus remained generally outside of the 
movement. Significantly, the KDP’s alliance with the Iraqi Communist Party broke, 
costing the movement an ally with significant influence in the rest of Iraq. Had the 
nationalists not chosen the quick growth Barzani offered, and had instead methodically 
grown its base by incorporating all of the disaffected groups, the movement would likely 
have been more inclusive and would have potentially avoided the inter-group conflicts of 
the next half-century.67 
The weakness of the security structures of the nascent Iraqi State seemed to offer 
another opportunity for revolt in 1943. This time Barzani led the revolt, and the Iraqi 
military proved incapable of suppressing it. However, once again the British military 
intervened and removed any structural opportunity for independence. Mullah Mustafa 
was pushed out of Iraq and into Iran, where he was influential in the short-lived Kurdish 
Republic of Mahabad, until he was exiled to the Soviet Union until 1958. Though 
Barzani had a larger base and was able to resist the Iraqi Government more than Barzinji, 
old tribal rivalries again emerged. This time it was the Barzani’s traditional rival, the 
large Zibari tribe, which defected to the Iraqi government’s side and helped defeat 
Barzani.  
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Though Barzinji succeeded in starting to frame the struggle for independence as a 
Kurdish nationalist movement, it was Barzani who took the seed of ethnic nationalism 
and began to bring it to fruition. Until his death in 1979, his name became inseparable 
from the movement. Though unable to frame a narrative that coalesced the Kurds at this 
juncture, one positive thing emerged for Kurdish grievance framing. The Anglo-Iraqi 
statement of intent regarding the Kurds in 1922 granted them the right to establish a 
Kurdish government within Iraq’s boundaries, as well as the form of government of their 
choosing and the relationship they would have with the Iraqi Government. Initially, this 
countered the grievance framing of the Kurds by removing many of their complaints, at 
least on paper. In the long run, however, it helped the Kurds. The Kurds would never 
again have to argue whether they had legal right as a special group within Iraq.68 From 
this agreement onward, they fought for what was due to them, and by not receiving it 
they were being denied their legal rights as a recognized group. 
Other than the growing legend of Mustafa Barzani and his Peshmerga as fighters 
capable of defeating the Iraqi army, and the recognition given in the Anglo-Iraqi 
statement, the period was a failure. By not incorporating the grievances of the non-tribal 
peasant class, and re-enforcing the connection between the nationalist movement and 
traditional elites, the movement failed to include the entirety of the Kurdish state.69 
C. THE RISE OF THE BA’ATH PARTY AND THE IRAN–IRAQ WAR 
From the fall of the Monarchy in 1958 until the end of the Iran–Iraq war, there 
were several instances where the structures of the state and international community 
seemed to offer the Kurds chances for control of their political destiny. Once again the 
factional lines identified above prevented the Kurds from taking advantage of these 
structural opportunities.  
When General Abdel Karim Qassim overthrew the Monarchy in 1958, he 
established some semblance of democracy. Qassim was looking for allies in his fight 
against former Monarchy sympathizers, as well as other dissident groups, and he 
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embraced the Kurds in this role. He declared his desire for strong relations with the 
Kurds, welcomed Barzani back to the country, and legalized the KDP. In return, Barzani 
helped him suppress his opponents. The new constitution recognized and guaranteed 
Kurdish rights within Iraq, several Kurds were given high offices in the government, 
Kurdish periodicals began to grow in number, and the general opportunity for the Kurds 
seemed to increase.70 
However, the structural opportunities began to shrink when Qassim became 
worried about Barzani’s growing power. He was not alone, and there were ample Kurdish 
rivals available for Qassim to use against Barzani. While Barzani was in exile, the KDP 
had re-established relations with leftist groups and made inroads with the non-tribal 
groups. However, when Barzani returned, those gains were lost. Because Barzani 
provided an easy source of fighters and commanded so much respect, the nationalist 
movement once again mortgaged their future for the chance at a quick fix when they gave 
him control of the movement. Qassim quickly backtracked on his promises and armed 
rival tribes against Barzani.71 Telling of Barzani’s inability to unite the Kurds Barzani is 
how that when he revolted, instead of attempting to include all Kurds, his first targets 
were his Kurdish rivals.72 
Initially, the Politburo kept the KDP from fighting because they concerned about 
the ease in which Barzani had returned to power. They were also wary of the cult of 
personality growing up around him. Many saw Barzani’s revolt as more of a power-grab 
than one with true nationalist motivations.73 As exclusionary as Barzani could be toward 
some groups within Kurdistan, he did one significant thing for the resource mobilization 
of this era and into the future. In order to broaden his base, he brought to his side the 
Assyrian Christians.74 Fighting the repression of the Iraqi state created a cause shared by 
all groups of the region, something that continues in the present day. Barzani also 
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mobilized the external support of Iran and Turkey, which provided both passive and 
active support against Qassim.75 
There were four military campaigns between 1961 and 1969. Because of 
Barzani’s military successes and issues in Baghdad, Qassim’s regime crumbled in 1963, 
yet the fighting continued with the following regimes. In these clashes, the Kurds 
generally got the better of the Iraqi forces but could never gain full independence. When 
in 1966, after Iraqi forces were defeated by Barzani’s forces in the Battle of Hendrin, the 
civilian prime minister at the time, Abd al Rahman Bazzaz, sued for peace. The resulting 
1966 Bazzaz Declaration offered the Kurds far-reaching autonomy, including a provision 
for parliamentary democracy in all of Iraq. However, Iraq’s military leadership did not 
support Bazzaz and his lenient policy towards the Kurds, so they deposed him, which 
caused the violent confrontation with the Kurds to continue for four more years.76 
Throughout the 1960s, during his war with the Iraqi state, Barzani attacked and, at 
times, destroyed the villages of his tribal rivals. Though this gained him the support of 
some smaller tribes who joined his cause out of fear, it caused some of the much larger 
tribes, such as the Baradostis, Herkis, and Surchis, to side with the government against 
him.77 Barzani accepted a cease-fire in 1964 with Abd el Aslam Arif; this led to a final 
split between the KDP Politburo and Barzani. The terms were worse than Qassim had 
offered four years before, and Barzani did not bothered to consult the rest of the party in 
accepting them. This illuminated the differences between the Politburo, which believed in 
an inclusive nationalist movement, and Barzani, who they believed wanted to dominate 
as its sole leader. Barzani, controlling more military forces, drove the Politburo into exile 
in Iran.78  
In 1968 the Ba’ath party took control of the Iraqi government and looked to make 
peace with the Kurds. The Kurds, having seen Barzani’s recent success in fighting the 
Iraqi military, and harboring distrust of the honesty of the new peace offer, declined the 
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deal. The infusion of U.S. CIA, Israeli, and Iranian support of Barzani against the Ba’ath 
further convinced the KDP that success was possible.79  
The structural opportunity for the Kurds against the Ba’ath seemed quite enabling 
until the divisions within the Kurdish areas re-emerged. This time the former KDP 
Politburo, under the leadership of Jalal Talibani, entered negotiations with the Ba’ath and 
returned from exile. Talibani accepted a Ba’ath peace deal and moved back into Iraq with 
Iraqi military support. However, even with Iraqi support, he could not compete with 
Barzani’s charismatic leadership, the Peshmerga he commanded, and the external support 
he received from Iran, Israel and the CIA. In 1970, the Ba’ath turned away from Talibani 
and were forced to negotiate with Barzani. The resulting terms were some of the best yet 
for Kurds. Because their military campaigns had gone poorly against the Kurds, and they 
needed to focus on consolidating their power over the whole Iraqi state, the Ba’ath 
required temporary quiet on the Kurdish front.80  
The terms of the agreement, however, were never implemented. Almost 
immediately the debate on the boundaries of Kurdistan and the inclusion of the oil-rich 
areas surrounding Kirkuk resurfaced.81 Even with this position of strength, the 
opportunity structures for full independence did not exist. Although Israel and Iran 
wanted to weaken the socialist Ba’ath, they did not support full autonomy for the 
Kurds.82 
When the Ba’ath failed to make good on their promises to the Kurds in 1970, the 
Kurds under Barzani created a strong narrative for all Kurds that was counter-productive 
to negotiate with the Ba’ath government in the future83 Not only was Barzani able to 
paint the Ba’ath as dishonest, but he successfully framed Talibani as a traitor for 
negotiating with them.84 
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The USSR entered the fray with the Soviet-Iraq friendship and cooperation treaty 
of 1972 and began to close off the political opportunity the Kurds enjoyed since 1960. 
The Soviets provided drastically more military capability than Israel, and Iran did. By 
1974 The Iraqi state’s ability to repress became unprecedented, and it threw 
overwhelming force at the Peshmerga, which, failing to recognize the shift in the power 
balance, had not reverted to guerilla tactics yet and mistakenly tried to continue a more 
conventional war.85 Even in the face of such an overwhelming force, the Peshmerga 
maintained the struggle until the Algiers Treaty between Iran and Iraq in 1975, which 
ended the political opening afforded by external support for the Kurds. Iran withdrew all 
support of Barzani and convinced the CIA and Mossad to do the same. Without external 
support the Ba’ath quickly defeated Barzani. Thousands of Kurds fled to Iran, including 
Barzani, who died four years later of cancer.86 
It is a significant demonstration of how polarizing Barzani was that, even in these 
dire circumstances, he was unable to unite enough Kurds, resulting in rivals fighting with 
the Ba’ath. In addition, the non-tribal proletariat and peasants were disillusioned by the 
traditional elites who Barzani championed and still remained out of the fray. This 
severely hurt the chances of success and the ability to fight a guerilla war once Barzani 
switched tactics, because it was easy for the Ba’ath to target Barzani’s support base.87 
With control of the north, the Ba’ath began Arabization by infusing up to 250,000 Arabs 
into the oil rich cities of Kirkuk, Khanaqueen and their surrounding areas. At the same 
time the Ba’ath forcibly moved up to 300,000 Kurds into southern areas of Iraq.88 
It was now Jalal Talibani’s turn to put on the mantle of Kurdish nationalism. 
Talibani mobilized the former leftist, intellectual, urban Politburo of the KDP as well as 
the Qadiri Sufi, Sorani-speaking plains Kurds and other disaffected former members of 
the KDP. This new group, called the PUK, returned to Iraqi Kurdistan and took up a 
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protracted guerrilla struggle. Talibani and the PUK successfully framed Barzani as 
abandoning the nationalist cause, and used it as an opportunity to create a narrative with 
themselves as the true nationalists, a position they held until the Iran–Iraq war, and one 
which they have shared with the KDP ever since. From this new position of leadership 
the PUK petitioned the UN on human rights with regard to the military crimes and 
Arabization policies of the Ba’ath.89  
In a sign that Kurdistan was rapidly moving towards a system run purely by 
patronage politics, the previously ideological groups that formed the PUK now behaved 
in a manner so close to the KDP under Barzani that most Kurds, especially the non-tribal, 
peasant class, could not tell the difference. Because of this, they did not support the PUK 
either. Barzani’s son Masud mobilized the remnants of the KDP and began their own 
guerilla campaign, as well as other small groups. Even facing the overwhelming force of 
the Iraqi’s, the Kurds could not look past the power struggle between the different groups 
and a civil war broke out in 1978. Talibani even mobilized Syrian Kurdish fighters to 
help his cause against both the Ba’ath and his Kurdish rivals.90 
When the Ayatollah Khomeini overthrew the Shah of Iran in 1979, both the PUK 
and KDP sought support of the new Iranian leadership. It was the new KDP that secured 
it in exchange for help fighting against the KDP-I. This willingness to fight other Kurds, 
even outside of Iraq, angered many and damaged the nationalist image the KDP was 
trying to cultivate.91 
The former vice president of Iraq, Saddam Hussein, came to power in 1979 and 
launched a full-scale invasion of Iran in 1980. The Iranians found willing allies with the 
Iraqi Kurds, who were anxious to regain what they had lost in 1975 and willing to open a 
northern front against Saddam. At the same time, Saddam aided the KDP-I against the 
Iranians. When towards the end of the war it appeared the Iranians would win, there was 
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a brief opening in the opportunity structures. However, fearing the “fundamentalist” 
Iranian victory, Western nations threw their support to Saddam, which effectively closed 
off the Kurds chance at separating from Iraq at the time.92 
During the Iran–Iraq war, the Kurdish groups on both sides of the border had the 
opportunity to greatly increase their negotiating power. Again, factional politics proved 
too powerful. Even while fighting the Iraqis the PUK and KDP fought each other until 
1987. This greatly hurt their ability to mobilize against their enemies in Iraq and Iran.93 
In 1987, prompted by extreme losses and the recognition of a real chance to 
defeat Saddam while he was distracted fighting the Iranians, the Iraqi Kurds united. The 
PUK, KDP, and other Kurdish groups joined together to form the Iraqi Kurdish Front 
(IKF). The IKF reached out to other dissident Iraqi groups to form the Iraqi National 
Front the express goals of which were to overthrow Saddam, end the Iran–Iraq war, 
Kurdish national rights, democratic choice, and the safeguarding of minority rights 
throughout Iraq.94 This alliance created the first really strong narrative of unity for the 
region. However, the movement was unable to successfully court the more modern, 
intellectual, non-tribal Kurds and the landless peasants.95 That they still failed to form a 
more inclusive narrative in word or deed demonstrates how close to the KDP and PUK 
had become in practice. The PUK and KDP were both seen by many as more interested 
in growing their patronage network and dominating Iraqi Kurdistan than building a 
modern nationalist state, the goal the leadership of the PUK once held.96 
When the tide turned more in Iraq’s favor, and even before the war was over, it 
began punishing the Kurds. The now infamous Anfal campaign of the late 1980s was an 
attempt to finally resolve the Kurdish issue for Saddam. It was an extremely violent drive 
to pacify Kurdistan and included the use of chemical weapons on the villages of Shaikh 
Wisan, and Halabja. The Iraqi state “showed a capacity and propensity for repression not 
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seen since the time of the National Socialists in Germany or Stalinism in the USSR.”97 
With this unprecedented violence, the ability of the Kurds to mobilize dissipated.98 
The Anfal campaign was so dominant that it temporarily overwhelmed any ability 
for a strong narrative to succeed. At the time, any idea of forming a shared Kurdish 
consciousness would have seemed unwise and unlikely.99 However, it may have become 
the strongest tool for grievance framing to date. Not only did their suffering provide the 
Kurds a boost in shared identity, but because it was so horrific and involved the use of 
chemical weapons, it became a powerful tool in gaining the international community’s 
support. The memory of its horrors would play a major role in the UN’s establishment of 
the no-fly zone in 1991. 
D. THE GULF WAR OF 1991 AND THE NO-FLY ZONE 
Before Saddam invaded Kuwait in 1990, the Kurds had possibly the smallest 
amount of structural opportunity in their history. The 1991 Gulf War rapidly changed 
those structures. The United States encouraged the Kurds and the Shia from southern Iraq 
to revolt against Saddam after their rout of his military in Kuwait. Believing they had the 
support of the military that had dispatched the Iraqi army in only 100 hours, they thought 
the structural opportunity had opened for them. 
In March, revolts erupted across Kurdistan, and by the end of the month the Kurds 
controlled all of Kurdistan to include Kirkuk. Saddam quickly turned the remaining 
might of his military with its tanks, multiple launch rocket systems, artillery and 
helicopter gunships toward the Kurds. Initially the Bush administration, failed to 
intervene and help the Kurds. The Kurdish leadership pleaded for the United States to 
intervene. Quickly the Kurds were driven from Kirkuk, and within 72 hours hundreds of 
thousands of refugees were heading to the Turkish and Iranian borders.  
With an exploding humanitarian crisis and the possibility of another Anfal 
campaign, the international community responded. The UN established a no-fly zone 
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covering most of Iraqi Kurdistan. Even though the UN resolution guaranteed Kirkuk, 
Sinjar, and Khanaqeen, Saddam never agreed to the stipulations and never signed an 
autonomy agreement. However, the Kurds had enough military strength to defend their 
area along with the UN guaranteed no-fly zone, and for the first time in the century, the 
Kurds controlled their own political life.100 
Although the Kurds desired independence, they were more interested in showing 
the world that they could self govern.101 They understood that the international 
community, most importantly the Turks and the United States, did not support full 
independence, and that their improved situation was contingent on the no-fly zone 
provided by these nations. Instead, they focused on governing the Kurdish Autonomous 
Zone (KAZ) and held elections for the first Kurdish Regional Government (KRG).102 
In the first session of the KRG, the PUK and KDP ruled with an almost perfect 
50/50 split. This was a good sign in some capacity because the two largest patrons of the 
region were cooperating, but it disillusioned other non-affiliated Kurds who wanted more 
inclusion. The KRG became a façade of a true democracy with the actual decisions of 
state made within the leadership of the PUK and KDP, not Parliament. The KDP and 
PUK became the largest employers, still paying and maintaining their Peshmerga, paying 
pensions to veterans, and supporting the families of the fallen, the two parties completed 
the transition into a patronage system. No longer were the KDP and PUK reliant on their 
traditional bases, and the Aghas often switched sides depending on which patron offered 
them more benefits. This system even incorporated the minority groups, traditionally 
outside the PUK and KDP rivalry. During this time The KRG relied on illicit trade with 
Turkey for funding, as well as meager international aid. The parties needed these 
resources for their clients, and because it controlled the Turkish border, the KDP was 
winning the money war. For this reason, the PUK likely started the Civil War in 1994.103  
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Even though the majority of Kurds understood the need for unity in the face of 
Saddam’s forces, as well the need to appear united for the support of the international 
community, the leadership of the parties could not work out a resource sharing 
agreement. In the civil war that ensued, the PUK managed to gain control of Erbil and 
most of the KAZ. In a sign that even with the structural opportunity a protected zone 
provided the Kurds, they still could not overcome their traditional grievances; the KDP 
invited the Iraqi army into Kurdistan to help remove the PUK from Erbil. When the Iraqi 
military left, the PUK retook their traditional zone of influence but not Erbil. The struggle 
between the two groups lasted until 1998, when they signed a peace agreement and 
effectively split Kurdistan in half. Although all parties would still view Iraqi Kurdistan as 
one entity, it had two governments with the PUK controlling Sulaymaniyah and the 
southeast and the KDP controlling Erbil and northwest.104  
The Kurds constructed internally and externally resonating narratives during this 
period. First, their successful framing of Saddam as a “modern day Nebuchadnezzar 
intent on genocide”105 who had committed the chemical weapons attack on the Halabja 
was a driving force in the establishment of the no-fly zone over their territory. The 
international media and humanitarian organizations propagated the grievance framing of 
the Kurdish narrative, generated sympathy within the United States and Britain, and 
created the moral justification for the establishment of the no-fly zone. The Kurds also 
succeeded in framing the initial election of the KRG as successful and demonstrative of 
their ability to handle democracy and self-rule. This greatly helped with their perceived 
legitimacy to the international community.106 In addition, during this time the shared 
hardship of the Arabization experienced before the Gulf War, created a sense of shared 
suffering between the Kurds and the minority groups within the region, helping to 
incorporate them into the Kurdish state more than ever before.107 
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However, the civil war and the willingness of the KDP to use Saddam’s forces in 
order to fight its rivals, greatly undermined the intended appeal of the Kurdish narrative. 
They still depended on an image of a united Kurdistan for the mobilization of 
international support, as well as growth of the nationalist movement. Opponents of 
Kurdish autonomy still harken back to this time when they argue that the Kurds in Iraq 
are too backward and divided to handle political self-determination.108  
E. 2003 INVASION 
When the United States overthrew the Ba’ath regime of Saddam Hussein in 2003 
during Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), they drastically increased the structural 
opportunities for the Kurds. When the Turks proclaimed Iraqi Kurd independence a casus 
belli if allowed, it demonstrated that the structures of the international community 
remained against complete autonomy. However, there were advantages to not gaining 
independence at the time. First, the coalition and the new government in Baghdad 
provided resources to the Kurds. Second, the Kurds soon gained a great deal of influence 
within Iraq with the signing of the Iraqi constitution of 2005. The Kurds essentially 
became king makers within Iraq with the veto power they gained over any new law. They 
also found themselves in a key brokerage position between the Shia and Sunni factions in 
Iraq. The Kurds controlled 19% of the Iraqi Parliament and the Iraqi Presidency. This 
meant that when they voted in a united block, the Kurds became an indispensible part of 
any coalition government in Baghdad.109  
For the first time since the end of WWI, the Kurds largely avoided the infighting 
that had characterized them for so long. They transcended the split between the PUK and 
KDP and operated as a united government. Though rivalries still remained, they 
presented a united front to the world. Importantly, the political diversity and participation 
within Kurdistan increased greatly. The Gorran party (Change Movement), with a 
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platform for reform, emerged as a significant force within the KRG. A mobilization of 
the youth, intellectual and working class that traditionally remained above the fray joined 
the political conversation and caused the power of the traditional elites to begin to 
shrink.110  
Militarily, the Kurds became the coalition’s go-to force and operated under 
coalition command and control in the early years of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). Later 
they infused Peshmerga into the Iraqi army as well as maintaining their own forces. This 
gained them representation within the Iraqi military, while maintaining the capability to 
forcefully secure their gains in autonomy.111 In terms of the ability to mobilize economic 
resources, the Kurds still gained a majority of their funds from Iraq and oil sharing 
revenue. The ability of the Kurds to export directly to Turkey was, until recently, a matter 
of contention between Erbil and Baghdad.112 
The Kurds were very successful at framing themselves as the only democratic and 
reliable allies within Iraq for U.S. forces. Internally, the repression of the previous 
decades created a stronger sense of Kurdishness than at any time in their past and a vast 
majority of Kurds in 2005 Identified as Kurds and not Iraqis. They almost universally 
believed in their right to full independence; however, they understood that the 
international system was still opposed it. Because they still needed the support of NATO, 
Iran, and the trade with Turkey, they could not push for independence.113 
When framing their narrative to the international community, they needed one 
more essential element. They understood that if they were to eventually push for full 
independence, they had to demonstrate they had first exhausted all options in trying to 
remain under a federal Iraq.114  
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F. THE CURRENT SITUATION 
Even with the recent spread of Daesh in Iraq, the structural opportunities for the 
Iraqi Kurds have never been as strong as they were after the fall of Mosul and the 
significant shifting of power structures that followed. Under the watchful eye of non-
governmental organizations, student’s groups, business professionals, and the 
international community, the political system of the KRG has become more inclusive. 
Maybe the greatest sign of this is that the Gorran party gained more seats in the 2013 
parliamentary election than the PUK. There has also been an increase in minority 
political parties, with the current session of Parliament being the most inclusive in 
Kurdish history. Press coverage of protests against the PUK and KDP in 2011, dubbed 
the Kurdish Spring, precipitated a drastic drop in suppression of civil liberties by 
traditional patron families. Overall, there has been a slow shift away from the elite 
patronage politics of the past and toward a more modern and inclusive democracy.115  
As dangerous as the Daesh capture of Mosul has been for overall regional 
stability, the weakness it exposed in the Iraqi military opened structural opportunities for 
the Kurds. The Kurds, with the support of U.S. airstrikes, secured Kirkuk, the Mosul 
Dam, Sinjar, and Khanaqeen, and now are in a defensive position that neither Daesh nor 
the Iraqi army can remove them from. Before the fall of Mosul, the Kurds understood 
that if they wanted full independence, they would have had to abandon their desire to 
include Kirkuk in their state. However, the Kurds are currently in a situation where they 
can win lasting control their newly gained territories by simply holding their position. If 
they choose to remain within a federal Iraq, they have already begun the census 
guaranteed by the 2005 Iraqi Constitution, which will likely show these areas rightfully 
fall under the KRG because of their Kurdish majority.116  
If one of the key impediments to full independence was Turkey calling Kurdish 
independence a casus belli in 2003, that block may be slowly disappearing. Turkey is 
                                                 
115 Gurses and Romano, Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, 
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116 ʻAbd al-Jabbār and Dawod, The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics, 252. Gareth Stansfield, 
“Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge Or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq," Middle East Memo, Number 33, 
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now closer with the KRG than Baghdad and sees the Kurds in Iraq as allies in their 
efforts to aid rebel forces in Syria. They have recently shown support for the KRG in 
military, political, and economic ways. Simply put, they may not oppose Kurdish 
independence anymore. The Kurds also enjoy a silent friendship with the Israelis, and the 
Arab states have begun to warm to the idea of an independent Kurdistan.117 Despite the 
aid the Kurds receive separately from Iran and NATO, these nations currently oppose 
Kurdish independence, and provide the only remaining international structural block to 
it.118  
The unprecedented period of unity between the PUK and KDP, as well as the 
increase in participation from previously uninvolved groups, has created a drastic 
increase in nationalist pride. It has become political suicide for any Kurdish politician to 
espouse weakness on autonomy for the Kurds, even if it does not make sense in the 
greater context of the geopolitical situation.119 The Kurdish Spring also demonstrated the 
ability of the youth, academics, and reformist political parties like Gorran to mobilize 
mass support and limit the power of the traditional elites. This has the potential to finally 
fully mobilize the Kurds.120  
In terms of economic mobilization, the Kurds still receive their largest amount of 
funds from Baghdad, though that may be slowly changing. The Turks and Kurds have 
signed a bilateral trade agreement and there are currently 1,000 Turkish companies within 
Iraqi Kurdistan as well as a Pipeline for direct export of Kurdish oil into Turkey. This is 
all with the grudging approval of the Iraqi government, who cannot afford to loose the 
Kurds.121  
                                                 
117 Romano and Gurses, Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the Middle East: Turkey, Iran, 
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The Kurds have successfully framed themselves as the most democratic, 
representative, inclusive, and protective of civil liberties of any entity in the region. This 
is a major source of pride for the Kurds, and it greatly improves their narrative with the 
international community. They are possibly more united than ever before, and they have 
been successful in presenting that unity to the world. With the influx of minorities and 
Arabs fleeing the rest of Iraq, the Kurds are integrating these groups into their society and 
creating a narrative of themselves as the protectors of persecuted groups within Iraq.122  
The Kurds, with all of their disagreements, have seemed to have finally created a 
narrative on which all groups agree. It is comprised generally of the following: 1) the 
Kurdistan region of Iraq has the right to self-determination through independence or 
through a federal state; 2) Kurdish nationalism and the Kurdish national culture are the 
foundation of that self determination, and the Kurds have exclusive right to the territory 
that falls under the KRG; 3) the KRG is the legal governing authority for the Kurds of 
Iraq; and 4) the Kurds should avoid going to war with each other as they did in the 
1990s.123 
G. SMT CONCLUSION 
This analysis of the Kurds’ ability to capitalize on structural opportunities, 
mobilize resources, and frame their narrative provides the perfect context for the SNA of 
the next chapter. Though not featured prominently in the SMT analysis above, the 
minority groups in Iraqi Kurdistan occupy a unique position. They have enjoyed ever 
more inclusion in the politics of the region, yet have avoided the focus of coalition efforts 
within Kurdistan. The Assyrian Christians, the Yazidis, and the Turkmen have been 
integrated to varying degrees into the complex power structures of Kurdistan, and they 
likely occupy positions of insight, span boundaries between multiple Kurdish groups, and 
can potentially act as brokers between them. Especially for the United States, leveraging 
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these groups can help it further understand the human domain and maintain leverage 
within Kurdistan.  
The Kurds are already in the best situation they have ever been to exercise 
autonomy, making them potentially one of the winners of the current crisis regarding 
Daesh. The United States cannot afford to fail to manage their rise in prominence or 
underestimate their position to act as brokers between rival factions within Iraq. Using 
the Kurds as an example of why federalism can succeed in Iraq can move Iraq in that 
direction. Even Ayed Allawi, a prominent Sunni politician in Iraq calling for a loose 
federal state, has argued recently that the Kurdish state should be an example for all Iraqi 
regions. Many argue this offers the greatest hope for the stability of Iraq.124  
The Kurds are a great example of the documented phenomenon that happens 
when traditional structures are put through the crucible of intrastate conflict. These 
conflicts often turn traditional structures, which are the easiest to mobilize, into patronage 
systems. In addition, current and future conflict will often be characterized by multi-
factional civil wars similar to the experience of the Kurds within Iraq. By looking at how 
the Kurds, one of the longest repressed groups in the world, finally united, rose to relative 
prominence, and rapidly shifted towards an inclusive democracy in the span of less than 
two decades is a good case study for other similar conflicts. The United States must learn 
lessons from the Iraqi Kurds when it inevitably tries to influence, understand, and 
manage similar conflicts now and into the future. The success of the United States in 
conflicts for the foreseeable future may well depend upon it. 
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IV. SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS OF IRAQI KURD 
POWER STRUCTURES  
This chapter uses social network analysis (SNA) to analyze the major political 
parties of Iraqi Kurdistan, the Kurdish Regional Government’s Parliament and Cabinet, 
the Ministers of Parliament in the Iraqi government, the political movements of Iraqi 
Kurdistan, the non-political organizations of Iraqi Kurdistan, and the military connections 
of Iraqi Kurdistan. Its purpose is to identify the formal, and more importantly, the 
informal power structures of this currently vital geopolitical region. The goal is to 
illuminate relatively unknown, yet important, individuals who currently occupy key 
locations within the power networks of Kurdistan, or more importantly, who will occupy 
positions of power in the future. This is a part of a larger project on the power structures 
of Iraqi Kurdistan. Finally, Special Operations Command Central (SOCCENT) has 
indicated interest in Iranian influence among the Kurds, so this chapter will identify 
potential locations where Iran has shown influence and provide recommendations on how 
to counter that influence. Hopefully, the individuals identified as important to these 
networks will prove useful to SOCCENT and the coalition efforts in Kurdistan as a 
whole.  
The primary question to answer is what influential networks in Iraqi Kurdistan 
can be utilized for Special Warfare purposes. Particularly, who are the emerging leaders 
of the parties? Who are the brokers and boundary spanners? How connected or separate 
are the different parties with each other? And finally, how connected are the parties to 
outside entities, especially independence movements in Turkey and Iran, and the Iranian 
Government? We know that the Iranian Government works with the Kurdish militias 
(Peshmerga),125 but how connected are they to Kurdish political networks? 
The political history of the Kurdish nationalist movement during the 20th and 21st 
centuries is one of turmoil, infighting, and civil war. David Romano argues that these 
issues, stoked by outside powers and the Iraqi government, have prevented the Kurds 
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from gaining true autonomy. Still, though limited, the Kurds of Iraq have managed to 
gain the most autonomy from within the Kurdish diaspora, and they currently have virtual 
autonomy within the Kurdish Autonomous Zone (KAZ) in Iraq.126  
Originally, there was one major movement, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), 
which was led by the head of the Barzan tribe, Mustafa Barzani, which became the 
practical leader of the Kurdish nationalist movement within Iraq.127 Barzani, as the leader 
of the mountain Kurds from northern Kurdistan, who are Naqshibandi Sufi’s and speak 
Kurmanji Kurdish, faced opposition from the less mountainous and more urban southern, 
Qadiri Sufi, Sorani Speaking Kurds led by Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talibani.128 When 
Barzani died, Jalal Talibani rallied the southern Kurds to create the Patriotic Union of 
Kurdistan (PUK) in 1975.129 These two parties remain the dominant political and military 
forces within Iraqi Kurdistan today. 
Though they have been at peace since 1991, they have divided up Iraqi Kurdistan 
into de facto spheres of interest: The KDP, with its center in Erbil, and the PUK, with its 
center in Sulaymaniyah. Each party maintains its own Peshmerga forces, which loosely 
serve together under the Ministry of Peshmerga affairs, and each party maintains ties with 
different international players.130 In 2009, the Movement for Change, or Gorran, led by 
Nashirwar Mustafa, split from the PUK and formed an opposition party against the two 
party leading coalition. Gorran is popular among the youth and the more urban Kurds and 
believes the KDP and PUK have done a poor job of representing the Kurds.131 Finally, 
there are two Islamist parties, the Kurdish Islamist Group (KIG) and the Islamic Union of 
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Kurdistan (KIU), as well as small parties representing other minorities within Kurdistan 
such as the Turkmen, the Yazidi’s, and the Assyrians.132 
The data used in this SNA were coded from three major sources. The first is every 
article on Kurdistan in Al-Monitor written in 2014. Second, the websites for the KDP and 
PUK provided not only the structures of the parties, but also biographical data for most of 
its leadership. Finally, the website for the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) 
published the names and biographies of the Parliament and Cabinet members, and the 
Iraqi Government website published the Parliament and Cabinet members with their 
biographies, which provided historic affiliations to code, and attributes.  
A. METHODOLOGY  
This report primarily deals with the formal structures involved in politics and 
power within Iraqi Kurdistan. Though part of a larger project on the power structures in 
Kurdistan, which has a larger scope and is more difficult to define, this project includes 
only the actual members of the KRG’s Parliament, Cabinet, and Presidency, and the Iraqi 
Parliament, Cabinet, and Presidency, and the leadership structures of the political parties 
of Kurdistan. The parliaments are broken down by the political party of each 
representative as well as the parliamentary block or “list” they fall under. Included for the 
KRG are the last three parliaments and cabinets, which provide historical relational data. 
Also included is all the available biography data from the PUK and KRG websites and 
most of the KRG and Iraqi government websites. However, because the KDP website did 
not include biographies, there is a potential imbalance. Biographies for the Kurdish 
members of Iraqi Parliament exist but are not included in this data set because of time 
constraints. In addition, in order to balance the data set, this report has removed 
organizations unique to the PUK because of the lack of similar data. Finally, included is 
relational data from every Al-Monitor article dealing with Kurds over the past year, with 
a focus on military connections, especially with foreign powers.  
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The four networks coded for this project were the two-mode affiliation networks 
of government organizations, political movements, non-political organizations, and 
military affiliations. A two-mode network involves two nodes that are of different types; 
the individuals, or agents, are one set, and their organizations are the other type. The 
main political parties, originally considered political movements, are coded as attributes 
because they are large enough as organizations to assume they are irrelevant to the social 
network analysis. Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 are the sociograms for the two-mode networks of 
each network individually and then combined. The coded data were analyzed with the 
SNA tool, ORA.133 In all of the sociograms (i.e., network maps) red nodes indicate the 
KDP, blue indicates the PUK, dark purple, Gorran, and light purple, unknown political or 
non-KRG political party. Any changes to this scheme are noted in the captions. 
 
Figure 1.  Two-Mode Network Map of Government Organizations. Green 
represents the organizations.134 
                                                 
133 ORA Software. Kathleen M. Carley, Center for Computational Analysis of Social and 
Organizational Systems, Carnegie Mellon University, Copyright 2001–2011.  
134 ORA, for information concerning the data used in creating this image please contact the author. 
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Figure 2.  Two-Mode Network Map of Political Movements. 135 
 
Figure 3.  Two-Mode Network Map of Non-political Organizations. 136 
                                                 




Figure 4.  Two-Mode Network Map of Military Organizations. Yellow 
indicates the Badr Organization under Iranian Republican Guard Quds 
Force (IRGC-QF) influence. 137 
The next step was to transform each two-mode network into a one-mode network. 
One-mode networks involve only one type of node, in these cases, members of a Kurdish 
power structure where a tie between agents indicates their shared participation in an 
organization. The assumption is that a relationship exists between two agents who are 
members of the same organization if it is small enough. Tables 5, 6, 7, and 8 show the 
one-mode shared government organizations, political movements, non-political 
organizations, and military affiliation sociograms. These are followed by the combined 
network, which is called here the Iraqi Kurdistan power structures network (PSN). In the 
sociograms below, the nodes are sized by two factors to demonstrate nodes that occupy 
key structural positions. Cut points are individuals that lie on either side of a bridging tie 
between two separate groups, who if removed sever the ties between the networks. These 
individuals tend to broker influence and information flow. One actor with this position 
may not be significant, but if multiple actors are identified it can be useful building a 
strategy of influence. The other metric used to size nodes is boundary spanner potential 
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(BSP), which is the ratio of the betweeness centrality of an individual to their degree 
centrality. Betweeness centrality is the number of paths between all other actors an 
individual lies on, and degree centrality is the total number of ties an actor has. 
Individuals high in betweeness centrality and low in degree are theoretically located in a 
position to act as ties between different groups.138  
 
Figure 5.  One-Mode Network Map of Individuals Who Share Membership in 
a Government Organization. The larger nodes with their labels visible 
are those identified as cut points.139 
                                                 
138 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 254–255, 269. 
139 Cut-points are nodes that when removed, disconnect the network. See Sean F. Everton, Disrupting 
Dark Networks, 264–271; ORA, For information concerning the data used in creating this image please 
contact the author 
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Figure 6.  One-Mode Network Map of Individuals Who Share Membership in 
a Non-political Organization. Larger nodes are cut-points. 140 
 
Figure 7.  One-Mode Network Map of Individuals Who Share Membership in 
a Political Movement. The larger nodes are those identified as cut 
points. Green nodes indicate membership in the KIG or KIU. 141 
                                                 




Figure 8.  One Mode Network Map of Individuals Who Share Membership in a 
Military Organization. The yellow node is Hadi Amiri, the head of the 
Badr Organization connected to Iran. 142 
The union of the one-mode networks into one combined network provides a total 
view of the power structures of Kurdistan. The sociogram in Figure 9 includes all 919 
nodes and forms the basis for most of the analysis moving forward.  
                                                 
142 ORA, for information concerning the data used in creating this image please contact the author. 
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Figure 9.  Network Map of the Power Structures of Iraqi Kurdistan. The nodes 
are sized by boundary spanner, potential.143 
Although the leadership of the major political parties appears isolated in Figure 9, 
in reality they are not. In order for the SNA to identify key nodes, shared membership in 
the PUK or KDP alone was not considered a tie because of the large size of the groups. If 
a group has a large number of members, the assumption that they all share at tie is no 
longer valid. This does not mean they do not have relational ties to members of the 
political leadership, it just means the data on those relationships were unavailable, and it 
was not safe to assume they all knew each other. The appearance of isolation is an artifact 
of this assumption. There are many members of the KDP and PUK within the KRG and 
Iraqi Government, and it is safe to assume that they actually are relationally connected to 
their party. Because of this, when one of the below agents, especially the minority 
                                                 
143 Boundary spanner potential capture the ability of an actor to broker between groups. See formal 
definition below in Section E (“Analysis of Individual Actors”); ORA, for information concerning the data 
used in creating this image please contact the author. 
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members, acts as a broker within the power structures of the KRG, they are able to 
influence the major political parties because the major parties share membership within 
their smaller organizations and cliques. Consider whether the leadership of the 
Democratic or Republican parties within the United States has ties with their elected 
officials. The answer is clearly that they do, and the KRG is no different.  
B. NETWORK TOPOGRAPHY 
The standard measures of network topography are listed in Table 1. The network 
is large, with 919 nodes, with the longest path length between two nodes being eight, and 
the average distance between nodes being 3.59. The low average total degree, 
eigenvector, and betweeness centrality as well as the low overall density indicate that the 
network is not very dense, which is unsurprising because it represents distinct 
organizations that are often at odds with one another. However, the network is fairly 
cohesive, as demonstrated by the clustering coefficient of 0.67. To further demonstrate 
that the network is cohesive is to look at the fragmentation and connectedness scores, 
which are the additive inverse of one another. They indicate that only 20 percent of the 
network nodes cannot reach one another either directly or indirectly. For the Kurdish 
PSN, this is revelatory only in that it demonstrates that there are numerous pathways 
between groups, even traditional rivals such as the KDP, PUK and Gorran. There are also 
numerous ties between the Kurdish government, and the Iraqi Government, which 
indicates the KRG is integrated with the Iraqi government fairly well. Some policy 
makers and experts have contended that the KRG will split from Iraq,144 the 
connectedness of the KRG with the Iraqi government could indicate this is unlikely. On 
average nodes are members of three cliques (see next section for definition of cliques).  
                                                 




Table 1.   List of Topographic Measures, calculated by ORA. 145 
C. SUBGROUPS 
Using the PSN combined one-mode network, the next step was to run clustering 
algorithms to detect subgroups within the network. The most revelatory for this project, 
and its goal of identifying brokers, was the clique calculation, because according to 
Gould, in “Power Structures in Community Elites,” those with high inter-clique 
betweeness hold positions of influence and are likely to be brokers.146 A clique is defined 
as a group of which every member is tied to every other member.147 The clique size 
statistics for the PSN are in Table 2, and the sociogram of the two mode network of 
shared clique membership is displayed in Figure 10. 
                                                 
145 ORA, for information concerning the data used in creating this table please contact the author. 
146 Gould, Power and Social Structure in Community Elites, 531–552. 
147 Sean F. Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 171. 
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Table 2.   Clique Statistics. 148 
 
Figure 10.  Two-Mode Clique Network. Cliques are green; agents colored by 
political party. 149 
Figure 11 is a sociogram of a one-mode network where a tie indicates a shared 
clique affiliation and depicts the shared clique network of the combined Power Structure 
network.  
                                                 
148 ORA, for information concerning the data used in creating this table please contact the author. 








Figure 11.  One-Mode Network of Shared Clique Membership. Nodes are sized 
by boundary spanner, potential (defined in Section E). 150 
D. ANALYSIS OF INDIVIDUAL ACTORS 
The first step in gleaning anything of value from this network is to examine the 
metrics of individual actors, and identifying those who occupy key positions within the 
network. Table 3 identifies the top ten actors by standard network analysis measures. 
Degree centrality is the normalized count of how many ties an actor has. Betweeness 
centrality is the percentage of shortest pathways between all nodes that pass through a 
specific node.151 Eigenvector centrality is a variation on degree centrality except that it 
prioritizes ties to actors with numerous ties over those with few ties.152 And clique count 
indicates how many cliques (defined previously) to which an actor belongs. The more 
                                                 
150 ORA, for information concerning the data used in creating this image please contact the author. 
151 Author used the ORA software definition of betweeness centrality. 
152 Everton, Disrupting Dark Networks, 208. 
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cliques an actor is a member of, the more groups that node works within, and therefore is 
able to spread information, or have access to information from. 
 
 
Table 3.   Standard Node-Level Calculations. 153  
Of the individuals high in the metrics presented in Table 3, Bapir Kaka Mala 
Sleman, Ayeden Maruf Salim Ahmed, Imad Yokhana, Safiyah Taleb Ali Alshouhail, 
Salim Toma Kako, Yousif Mohamed, Yaqud Gorgis Yago Klya, and Wahida Yaqub 
Hormuz are members of minority political parties.  
The focus of this project, however, is to identify brokers, and the metric, 
boundary spanner potential, will be used to do so here. Formally, boundary spanner 
potential equals betweeness centrality divided by degree centrality; less formally, it 
identifies actors “that are potentially influential [because they] are positioned to broker 
connections between groups and to bring to bear the influence of one group on another or 
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serve as a gatekeeper between groups.”154 In Figure 10 above those actors with the 
highest boundary spanner potential are identified as larger nodes. These are potentially 
important individuals for SOCCENT when looking to exert influence on Kurdish power 
structure.  
 
Table 4.   Boundary Spanner Potential of the PSN. 155 
Of these individuals, Ayeden Maruf Salim Ahmed, Imad Yokhanna Yago 
Yokhanna, Bapir Kaka Mala Sleman, Safiyah Taleb Ali Alshouhail, Yonadem Yousef 
Kanna Khashaba, Yaqub Gorgis Yago Klaya, Wahida Yaqub Hormuz, Salim Toma 
Kako, Safiyah Taleb Ali Alshouhail, and Yousif Mohammed are members of minority 
groups traditionally forgotten by United States engagement.  
Table 5 lists the boundary spanning potential nodes in the shared cliques network. 
These agents are those who are members within many cliques and occupy these key 
positions.  
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Table 5.   Boundary Spanner Potential of the PSN where Nodes Share 
Clique Membership. 156 
Ayeden Maruf Salim Ahmed, Imad Yokhana Yago Yokhanna, Jihan Ismail 
Minyamin Barwari, Safihah Taleb Ali Ahlsouhail, Yonadem Yousef Knna Khoshaba, 
Bapir Kaka Mala Sleman, Mahmoud Ali Othman Omar, Yaqub Gorgis Yago Klya, and 
Yousif Mohammad are all members of minority political parties.  
                                                 


















































Figure 12.  One-Mode Network of PSN Shared Clique Membership. The nodes 
are sized boundary spanner potential. 157 
E. DISCUSSION 
So what is important for SOCCENT to understand about this network? Yes, the 
traditional power brokers still have an enormous amount of power in Kurdistan. The 
Barzanis, Talibanis, and the leaders of the PUK and KDP are still dominant. However, 
there are other individuals, mentioned above, who occupy key locations within the 
network, such as Bapir Kaka Mala Sleman and Ayeden Maruf Salim Ahmed. Many of 
those individuals, those with high boundary spanner potential and eigenvector centrality, 
are not widely known power players. Especially when trying to gain influence into the 
Kurdish power structures, building relationships with these individuals, who may have 
largely remained out of the focus of coalition efforts, will pay dividends when gauging 
Kurdish support for initiatives, or injecting coalition plans and ideas into Kurdish politics 
and power networks. Though not widely discussed, these minority groups have been 
represented within the Kurdish power systems for centuries, participating under the tribal 
patronage structures, fighting alongside and coexisting with the Kurds. Even today, 
though not considered powerful, the Turkmen occupy positions of prestige because they 
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descend from the elites of the Ottoman Empire, which is remembered fondly by many 
Kurdish groups. The Assyrian Christians, or Nestorians, at times occupied positions of 
military and political power the Kurds were forced to deal with as peers.158 Because of 
this, these groups are likely more integrated into Kurdish structures than in any other part 
of the Middle East. The members of these groups identified above are potential leaders of 
these groups, and are demonstrative of their potential as brokers between different 
Kurdish factions.  
When looking at how the Iraqi Kurds interact with international actors, whether 
state or non-state, these individuals are important as well. The increased standing of 
minority groups an important part of the Kurds narrative which espouses inclusiveness 
and democracy, but it has become source of pride among Kurds that they are so accepting 
of disaffected groups. These groups are also important when looking at Iranian influence. 
In Figure 13, it is clear that the PUK has a much larger connection with Iran than the 
KDP. And in Figure 9, Bapir Kaka Mala Sleman, Salim Toma Kako, Yaqub Gorgis Yago 
Klaya, Mahmood Ali Othman Omar, and Yonadem Yousef Kanna Khoshaba all score 
high in terms of boundary spanner potential and have connections with the PUK. They 
are also not members of the major political parties of Kurdistan. Mahmood Ali Othman 
Omar and Yonadem Yousef Kanna Khoshaba are not even in the KRG, yet have 
connections to the PUK. If looking to counter Iranian influence by increasing interaction 
with the PUK, these individuals provide potential avenues to that goal.  
                                                 
158 Van Bruinessen, Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of Kurdistan, 101, 
105, 107–108, 164. 
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Figure 13.  Power Structures Network Drilled down to KRG. Yellow indicates 
Iranian ties. 159 
If taking another route and looking to counter Iranian influence within the KRG 
by focusing efforts on the KDP or Gorran, again according to Figure 9, Yousef Mohamed 
has high boundary spanner potential and can potentially provide access. When looking at 
Figure 12, a few different names show themselves to be ideally located. Wahida Yaqub 
Hormuz is situated within the parliament of the KRG and has ties with both political 
parties, as well as scoring high in boundary spanner potential. Yaqub Gorgis Yago Klaya 
is Assyrian with high boundary spanner potential and has ties to both the KDP and PUK. 
This provides a non-Kurdish access agent with a key structural place within the critical 
region of Kurdistan. 
                                                 
159 ORA, for information concerning the data used in creating this table please contact the author. 
 63
F. SNA CONCLUSION 
This thesis has identified individuals who possess the potential for countering 
Iranian influence by interacting more with the PUK, by continuing to put more effort into 
working with the KDP as they have been, or by engaging with the Gorran Party or one of 
the other minority groups. I recommend that SOCCENT continue its relations with the 
KDP, but put a renewed effort into working with the PUK and the PUK Peshmerga in 
order to gain influence in the south and east of Kurdistan, the region controlled by the 
PUK and influenced by Iran. I also recommend engaging with the Gorran Party and the 
minority groups. The future of Kurdistan will likely have a larger role for these groups, 











A. FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATION 
While much insight has been gained from this project, it is nowhere near 
complete. There are numerous avenues of research I recommend for future study. First, 
further research into the biographies of the individuals identified in Chapter IV is needed 
in order to glean more relational data. To really understand the ability of these agents 
detailed information on their ego networks is needed.160 In addition, further research 
must try to determine the agency they possess to take advantage of their structural 
position. It is clear the minority groups are integrated into the government of the KRG, 
but how integrated are they into the Peshmerga?  
One way of determining this would be to use the relational data embedded in the 
Situation Reports (SITREPS) from United States forces in the region. Relational data 
from the SITREPS from United States units working with the Kurds can greatly improve 
the data from this project. Not only will this data potentially answer how integrated 
minorities are within the Peshmerga, but it can provide potential human pathways 
between United States personnel and the domain spanners that crosscut the patronage 
networks of the PUK and KDP.  
Multiple sources claimed that the Aghas, until recently at least, decided how their 
entire tribe would vote in elections much like major voting blocs in American elections. 
If this is true, tracking the tribal loyalties to different political parties is another 
interesting avenue for research. In “Robust Action: Rise of the Medici,” Padgett and 
Ansell discuss how the Medici’s expanded their influence through marriage ties, and the 
Sheiks did the same thing in the 19th century. If any data are available on the 
intermarriage between different factions in Kurdistan, SNA of such data could add a great 
deal of insight.  
Additional data sources should be explored too. Multiple business and academic 
forums are held each year in Erbil and Sulaymaniyah that are attended by heads of state, 
                                                 
160 An ego network is the network that surrounds an individual node within the network.  
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business leaders, and KRG members. To collect relational data of those who attend these 
forums may provide further insight into informal power structures. Just as in the United 
States economic power can be translated into political power, to map the business 
relationships of the political parties and government would add another layer of fidelity 
to the current data set of this project. It would also illuminate business connections with 
Turkey, Iran, and other parts of Iraq. 
An SMT and SNA analysis of the Kurdish Spring, to augment the more broad 
analysis in this project, could provide an entirely new set of brokers and future leaders of 
the KRG. It would likely identify student leaders, academics, and non-tribal actors who 
are changing the face of Iraqi Kurdistan. Researchers and analysts have mapped the 
social media interactions of the Arab Spring, and the same methods should work for the 
Kurdish Spring, and would likely provide insight this project could not.  
Finally, to build relational data for a network analysis of the interaction between 
the Iraqi Kurds, Kurds in Syria, Iran and Turkey, as well as the relationships between all 
Kurd groups and the governments of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey could be an extremely 
valuable project for SOCCENT, as well as providing insight to policy makers.  
B. SYNTHESIS OF SMT AND SNA 
The SMT analysis in Chapter III provided insight into a century of Kurdish 
repression allowed because the Kurds allowed infighting and patronage politics to 
prevent a full mobilization of the Kurds towards a full-fledged self-determination. With 
the Kurds possibly in the best position in their history, the United States should take into 
account how to leverage the current unity and status the Kurds enjoy. There are many 
reasons to be optimistic. The SNA in Chapter IV demonstrated the full integration of the 
regions minorities, as well as the emergence of Gorran and other political parties within 
the KRG. More significantly, minority groups occupy many of the structurally important 
brokerage positions within the KRG.  
The SNA also confirms that the PUK, KDP and Gorran interact within the KRG, 
and have formed a fairly dense network. The inter-connectedness, and shared clique 
memberships between members of the PUK and KDP especially bode well for the Kurds 
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maintaining some level of unity into the future. Some regional experts believe the Kurds 
will declare autonomy from Iraq, yet the SNA would indicate the Kurds are fully 
integrated into the Iraqi government, and the SMT indicates the Kurds are still not in a 
structural position where it makes sense to separate. Though the situation can obviously 
change, it appears unlikely the Kurds will declare independence anytime soon.  
With the knowledge from Chapter III, SOCCENT should understand that they 
must interact with the PUK and KDP, not only at the governmental level, but also at the 
ground level to identify the future leaders of these parties. More importantly, they must 
make an effort into engaging the Gorran party and other minority parties and groups. 
These groups are likely to hold positions of great power in the region, and to ignore them 
will undoubtedly hamper the United States’ ability to influence the region. These groups 
also provide avenues into the networks of the PUK and KDP.  
This is easier said than done, of course, but the SNA identified potential actors to 
help build relationships with the new groups. They not only are potentially influential and 
future leaders, but they likely know the current direction the KRG is heading, as well as 
the disposition and intentions of the PUK and KDP. To gain access to these individuals 
by identifying the minority representatives within the Peshmerga is within the abilities of 
SOF on the ground. It is likely that in a region still characterized by patronage, any 
officers within the Peshmerga that are Gorran or minorities are close with the powerful 
members of those groups. 
C. RELEVANCE TO SOCCENT AND THE FUTURE OF CONFLICT 
SOCCENT will be engaged with the Kurds for the foreseeable future, and thus 
will need to build strong relationships with all groups to understand and influence the 
future of Kurdistan. Though conventional war can never be ruled out, the likely conflicts 
the United States, and especially USSOF, will engage in in the near future will resemble 
the situation in Kurdistan. Multi-factional civil wars that cross international boundaries 
are characteristic of current conflicts in Iraq, Syria, Egypt, and numerous conflicts in 
Africa. These conflicts are made more complicated by the emergence of the ugly sides of 
traditional power struggles and patronage systems.  
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The Kurds of the 20th century can offer insight into these types of conflict. Not 
only did they struggle for political control within the Iraqi state, but they fought one 
another. The Kurds finally united only after it was necessary to maintain international 
support. The international community was willing to maintain the no-fly zone, and 
protect the Kurds as long as they appeared united. Once the Kurds re-framed their 
narrative towards inclusion, they achieved their goals. The United States should learn 
from this. The Kurdish situation would seem to contradict the point of view of those who 
argue that the United States should remain completely disengaged when presented with 
complex situations such as this. The United States did not choose sides between Kurdish 
factions in 1991 or 2003; it just provided the space the Kurds needed to deal with their 
internal struggles and unite against their enemies. The United States is now in an 
influential position with the Kurds, and it has a strong ally in the region. Could a similar 
model have been used in Syria? If the United States had established a no-fly zone over 
Syria before the Islamists hijacked the uprising, less radical groups compatible with our 
interests could have carved out an autonomous zone in Syria like the Kurds have in Iraq. 
If they had, the result would have provided a better situation than the current one where 
the United States would have better access and placement to control the pace of the civil 
war as well as the expansion of Daesh.  
With such success for the Kurds springing from such a tumultuous and factional 
history, the United States should hope for more outcomes like Kurdistan, rather than 
hoping entire states will become stable democracies. Instead, the United States should 
look to have strong allies, which they aid and possibly protect, as islands within 
otherwise violent and hostile regions. In order to do so, projects like this help provide the 
understanding of the human domain so essential in identifying with whom to engage. The 
engagement then has to begin well before the conflict becomes chaos, and continue 
throughout. The persistent engagement ARSOF 2022 espouses is exactly what policy 
makers will need to create success like Iraqi Kurdistan in the future.  
The Kurds have shown that limited goals like this are achievable. They provide a 
quasi-state ally situated in the middle of the largest geopolitical disasters of recent 
decades. It is the only bright spot for the United States in an otherwise dark situation. The 
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United States should be looking for similar opportunities in its future conflicts. The 
United States has historically either done little or conducted full invasions in these 
situations. Instead the United States should actively engage the various factions within 
these multi-factional civil wars to determine which to support, and provide them 
resources and structural opportunities to succeed. In this way, opportunity will arise for 





THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 71
LIST OF REFERENCES 
ʻAbd al-Jabbār, Fāliḥ and Hosham Dawod. The Kurds: Nationalism and Politics. 
London, UK: Saqi Books, 2006. 
Aminzade, Ron, Jack A. Goldstone, and Elizabeth J. Perry. “Leadership Dynamics and 
Dynamics of Contention.” Silence and Voice in the Study of Contentious Politics 
(2001): 126–154.  
Auyero, Javier, Pablo Lapegna, and Fernanda Page Poma. “Patronage Politics and 
Contentious Collective Action: A Recursive Relationship.” Latin American 
Politics and Society 51, no. 3 (2009): 1–31.  
Beehner, Lionel. “IRAQ: Cabinet Ministers.” Council on Foreign Relations; 
Backgrounder, May 12, 2005. http://www.cfr.org/iraq/iraq-cabinet-
ministers/p8061.  
Clifford, Bob and Sharon Erickson Nepstad. “Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement? 
Leadership and Assassination in Social Movements.” American Behavioral 
Scientist 50, no. 10 (2007): 1370–1394.  
———. “Kill a Leader, Murder a Movement? Leadership and Assassination in Social 
Movements.” American Behavioral Scientist 50, no. 10 (2007): 1370–1394.  
Carley, Kathleen M. ORA Software. Carnegie Mellon University: Center for 
Computational Analysis of Social and Organizational Systems, 2001.  
Clarke, Killian. “Unexpected Brokers of Mobilization: Contingency and Networks in the 
2011 Egyptian Uprising.” Comparative Politics, 46, no. 4 (2014): 379–397.  
Della Porta, Donatella. “Recruitment Processes in Clandestine Political Organizations: 
Italian Left-Wing Terrorism.” International Social Movement Research 1, (1988): 
155–169.  
Diani, Mario, and Doug McAdam. Social Movements and Networks: Relational 
Approaches to Collective Action. London: Oxford University Press, 2003.  
Emirbayer, Mustafa, and Jeff Goodwin. “Network Analysis, Culture, and the Problem of 
Agency.” American Journal of Sociology (1994): 1411–1454.  
Everton, Sean F., ed. Disrupting Dark Networks. Structural Analysis in the Social 
Sciences. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012.  
 72
Filkins, Dexter.  “A New Deal for the Kurds.” New Yorker, December 3, 2014. 
http://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/new-deal-kurds.  
Freij, Hanna Yousif. “Tribal Identity and Alliance Behaviour among Factions of the 
Kurdish National Movement in Iraq.” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 3, no. 3 
(1997): 86–110.  
Gould, Roger V. “Power and Social Structure in Community Elites.” Social Forces 68, 
no. 2 (1989): 531–552.  
Romano, David, and Mehmet Gurses. Conflict, Democratization, and the Kurds in the 
Middle East: Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2014.  
Han, Shin-Kap. “The Other Ride of Paul Revere: The Brokerage Role in the Making of 
the American Revolution.” Mobilization: An International Quarterly 14, no. 2 
(2009): 143–162.  
Harris, Kevan. “The Brokered Exuberance of the Middle Class: An Ethnographic 
Analysis of Iran’s 2009 Green Movement.” Mobilization: An International 
Quarterly 17, no. 4 (2012): 435–455.  
Headquarters, Gorran. “Official Website of the Change Movement (Gorran).” Gorran 
Headquarters. http://www.gorran.net/En/Content.aspx?LinkID=181.  
Kittleson, Shelly. “US, Iran Woo Rival Kurdish Factions in Battle against IS.” Al-
Monitor, September 22, 2014, http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/peshmerga-iraq-iran-kurd-isis-krg.html.  
Kurdistan Parliament. “Official website of the Kurdistan Parliament.” Accessed July/ 
2015, 2015. http://www.perlemanikurdistan.com/Default.aspx?l=1.  
Lee, Doowan. “A Social Movement Approach to Unconventional Warfare.” Special 
Warfare 26, no. 3 (September, 2013). 
http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swmag/archive/SW2603/SW26_03.pdf.  
Lister, Tim. “Iraq to Split in Three: So Why Not?” CNN, July 8, 2014, 
http://www.cnn.com/2014/07/07/world/meast/iraq-division-lister/. 
McDowall, David. The Kurds: A Nation Denied. London, UK: Harry Ransom 
Humanities Research Center, 1992.  
Gunter, Michael M. “The Kurdish Spring.” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 3 (2013): 441–
457.  
 73
Ollivant, Douglas, and Robert H. Scales. “Terrorist Armies Fight Smarter and Deadlier 




Osa, Maryjane. “Troublemakers and Counter-Revolutionaries. Network Development 
and Protest Cycles in Authoritarian Regimes” Conference on Social Movement 
Analysis: The Network Perspective, Ross Priory, Loch Lomond, Scotland, vol. 22, 
no. 25.6. 2000. 
Padgett, John F., and Christopher K. Ansell. “Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 
1400–1434.” American Journal of Sociology (1993): 1259–1319.  
Romano, David. The Kurdish Nationalist Movement: Opportunity, Mobilization and 
Identity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.  
Salih, Mohammed A. “Fate of Iraqi Presidency Divides Iraqi Kurds.” Al-Monitor, May 






Schwartz, Barry. “George Washington and the Whig Conception of Heroic Leadership.” 
American Sociological Review (1983): 18–33.  
Stansfield, G. “Kurdistan Rising: To Acknowledge Or Ignore the Unraveling of Iraq. 
Brookings Institute.” Middle East Memo 33, (July 2014, 2014).  
United States Army Special Operations Command. Arsof 2022: Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 2012. 
http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF2022_vFINAL.pdf.  
United States Special Operations Command. Socom 2020. 
http://www.defenseinnovationmarketplace.mil/resources/SOCOM2020Strategy.pdf.  
Van Bruinessen, Martin. Agha, Shaikh, and State: The Social and Political Structures of 
Kurdistan. Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Zed Books, 1992.  
Weber, Max. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization. New York: Simon and 
Schuster, 2009.  
 74
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
 75
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
 
